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MANAGING CORPORATE FEDERALISM: THE LEAST-BAD
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ABSTRACT
Over recent decades, shareholders in public corporations have
increasingly sought to augment their own power - and, correlatively, to
limit the power of boards - through creative use of corporate bylaws. The
bylaws lend themselves to such efforts because enacting, amending, and
repealing bylaws are essentially the only corporate governance actions that
shareholders can undertake unilaterally. In this Article, I examine the
contested nature ofbylaws, the fundamental issues ofcorporate power and
purpose that they implicate, and the difering ways in which state and
federal lawmakers and regulators may impact the debate regarding the
scope of the shareholders' bylaw authority.
The Article first discusses various dimensions of corporate
governance historically addressed in the bylaws, and the controversial uses
to which bylaws have been put by shareholders seeking greater corporate
governance power, focusing on Delaware - the jurisdiction ofincorporation
for most public companies. I then turn to the ways in which rules of
corporate governance are generated in our federal legal system, including
the complex and evolving mechanisms through which state and federal
lawmakers and regulators interact. In particular, I evaluate the SEC's
process for assessing whether shareholder proposals to amend bylaws must
be included in a public company's proxy statement, as well as the recently
created process through which Delaware permits SEC certification of
contested issues of state law directly to the Delaware Supreme Court - a
process the SEC has already used in evaluating the excludability of a
proposed shareholder bylaw amendment. I conclude that this process
threatens to substantially distort the evaluation and evolution of the
shareholders' bylaw authority by presenting the Delaware Supreme Court
with proposed bylaws to be assessed in the abstract - an awkward posture
resulting in the sacrifice of important values reflected in the ripeness
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doctrine, and abandonment of the presumption of validity that ordinarily
favors enacted bylaws.
I then consider who ought to determine the scope of permissible
shareholder bylaws, concluding that there is no perfect approach because
none ofthe relevant state andfederal actors dominates with respect to both
political legitimacy and expertise - the SEC possessing neither, while
Congress possesses the former and Delaware the latter. I argue, however,
that the least-bad approach would be to remove the SEC from the process
entirely, leaving these matters to Delaware in the first instance, subject to
potential intervention by Congress. The pragmatic means ofachieving this
outcome would be a strict SEC policy of refusal to permit exclusion from the
proxy of proposed shareholder bylaws prompting competing opinions of
Delaware counsel. This approach would eliminate the distortion introduced
by SEC certification, permitting resolution ofthe fundamental issues at stake
in a more organic and better informed manner through traditional
Delaware litigation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over recent decades, shareholders in Delaware corporations have
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increasingly sought to augment their own power-and, correlatively, to limit
the power of boards-4hrough creative use of corporate bylaws. Though an
ostensibly mundane and mechanical instrument of corporate governance, the
bylaws lend themselves to such efforts because-perhaps surprisingly-
enacting, amending, and repealing bylaws are essentially the only corporate
governance actions that shareholders can undertake unilaterally.
If such authority were entirely open-ended, then shareholders would
literally possess the power to rewrite the rules of corporate governance on a
company-by-company basis. The matter is not as straightforward as that,
however, because, in addition to broadly phrased statutory authority to
govern day-to-day corporate affairs, the board is generally granted bylaw
authority in its own right by the charter. Consequently, it will be the
Delaware courts' task to decide how far shareholder bylaws can go, and what
rules of priority might govern incompatible shareholder and board actions in
this area.
Fundamental ambiguities on these and related matters tee up a
collision of shareholder and board claims to power that, in turn, implicate the
core issues defining the field of corporate law. Who possesses ultimate
corporate governance authority? And toward whose interests should
corporate activities be directed? More concretely, can shareholders use their
bylaw authority to limit the board's governance authority-say, by
preventing the board from adopting takeover defenses? Likewise, could a
shareholder bylaw reining in the board be insulated from board repeal?
Much like the hostile takeover debate of the 1980s, the shareholder bylaw
debate reveals itself to be a battle of deeply conflicting philosophies
regarding the nature and purpose of the most consequential economic actors
on the planet.
In this Article, I examine the contested nature and use of bylaws, as
well as the differing ways in which state and federal regulators and
lawmakers may affect the outcome of the shareholder bylaw debate. As a
practical matter, a shareholder seeking to amend the bylaws of a public
company may have no alternative but to seek inclusion of a proposal to this
effect in the company's proxy statement, a matter regulated at the federal
level by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to its
broad statutory authority to regulate the solicitation of proxies. This adds
another layer of complexity to the shareholder bylaw debate because it
requires a threshold assessment of who ought to determine the permissible
scope of shareholder bylaws, which in turn requires consideration of how
state and federal governmental entities might interact and the competing
claims to legitimacy in matters of corporate governance that might be
advanced on their behalf.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses various dimensions
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of corporate governance historically addressed in the bylaws, and the novel
uses to which bylaws have been put by shareholders seeking greater
corporate governance power. As I explain, the outer reaches of the
shareholders' bylaw authority remain blurry today, reflecting the fact that
Delaware lacks a definitive theory regarding the appropriate role of
shareholders in corporate governance and the degree to which their interests
ought to prevail over those of other corporate constituencies.
In Part III, I turn to the ways in which rules of corporate governance
are generated in our federal legal system, including the complex and
evolving mechanisms through which state and federal lawmakers and
regulators interact. In particular, I evaluate the impact of the SEC's
shareholder proposal process on the bylaw debate, as well as the impact of a
recently created process through which Delaware permits SEC certification
of questions of state law directly to the Delaware Supreme Court. I conclude
that the resulting manner in which bylaw disputes arrive at the court
threatens to substantially distort the evaluation and evolution of the
shareholders' bylaw authority-and consequently the fundamental matters of
corporate governance policy implicated by the shareholder bylaw debate.
This distortion arises primarily due to the fact that SEC certification presents
the Delaware Supreme Court with a proposed bylaw (not an enacted one),
necessarily bereft of any factual background regarding its use. The
consequences-emonstrated by the first case to reach the court through this
process-are the sacrifice of important values reflected in the ripeness
doctrine, and abandonment of the presumption of validity that ordinarily
favors enacted bylaws.
Part IV builds on this analysis, evaluating who ought to determine the
scope of permissible shareholder bylaws. Here, I examine the competing
claims to legitimacy in matters of corporate governance that can be advanced
on behalf of the relevant state and federal actors-Delaware, Congress, and
the SEC. I conclude that there is no perfect approach to the shareholder
bylaw debate because none of these actors dominates with respect to both
political legitimacy and epistemic legitimacy (essentially a reputation for
expert, policy-relevant knowledge). The SEC, I argue, possesses neither,
while Congress possesses the former and Delaware the latter.
Ultimately, I conclude that the least-bad approach would be to leave
these matters entirely to Delaware-a claim supported by its considerable
epistemic legitimacy, coupled with at least indirect political legitimacy via
long-standing congressional acquiescence in Delaware's dominant corporate
lawmaking role and the potential for future intervention should Congress see
fit. The pragmatic means of achieving this outcome would be a strict SEC
policy of refusal to permit exclusion from the proxy of proposed shareholder
bylaw amendments that prompt competing opinions of Delaware
4 [Vol. 36
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counseln outcome consistent with the company's burden of persuasion
already established in the SEC's shareholder proposal rule. This approach, I
argue, would effectively eliminate the distortion introduced by SEC
certification of disputes over proposed bylaws directly to the Delaware
Supreme Court, thereby permitting resolution of the fundamental issues at
stake in a more organic and better informed manner through traditional
Delaware litigation.
II. THE CONTESTED NATURE OF "BYLAWS"
The debate regarding the scope of the shareholders' bylaw authority
has, unsurprisingly, involved analysis of the nature of bylaws and the role
they play in corporate governance. In this part of the Article, I discuss
various dimensions of corporate governance historically addressed in the
bylaws, and the novel uses to which they have been put by shareholders
seeking to augment their power over public companies-including the
assertion of control over sensitive matters like the use of takeover defenses.
As we shall see, the outer reaches of the shareholders'unilateral power
to enact, amend, and repeal bylaws remain blurry today, a state of affairs
reflecting Delaware's long-standing ambivalence regarding
shareholders--specifically, the lack of a definitive theory regarding the
appropriate role of shareholders in corporate governance and the degree to
which their interests ought to guide the activities of Delaware corporations.
A. Section 109's Grant ofPower
For lawyers steeped in the day-to-day practice of corporate law,
bylaws hardly represent the enigma that academics find them to be. One
practitioner's guide, for example, speaks of what Delaware bylaws
"typically" include-4hings like "meetings of stockholders; directors and
committees of directors; the selection and duties of officers; and
miscellaneous provisions" addressing indemnification and the like.' While
the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) concededly imposes "no
substantive restrictions" on their content, it is rightly observed that numerous
provisions throughout the Delaware statute provide guidance on the scope
and operation of bylaws in significant areas of corporate governance.' For
example, section 141 expressly permits bylaws to address the number of
'A. Gilchrist Sparks, Ml & Frederick H. Alexander, The Delaware Corporation: Legal
Aspects of Organization and Operation, 1-4th Corp.-Prac. Series (BNA) § II.D (2010).
2See generally id.
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board seats and director qualifications (section 141(b)); the powers of board
committees (section 141(c)); the board's capacity to act by written consent
(section 141(f)); the location of board meetings (section 141(g)); the board's
authority to set its own compensation (section 141(h)); and the capacity of
directors to participate in meetings remotely (section 141(i)).' Similar
guidance regarding the mechanics of shareholder action appears in section
211, which expressly permits bylaws to address the location of shareholder
meetings (section 211(a)); the date and time of the annual meeting for
election of directors (section 211(b)); and the authority to call special
meetings (section 211(d)). 4 Those seeking a standard "form" of bylaws for a
Delaware corporation addressing the typical contents noted above need only
consult one of the prominent treatises in the area.' In the ordinary life of a
Delaware corporation, a number of important (although mechanical) aspects
of corporate governance clearly fall within their ambit, such that bylaws are
aptly styled "the operating rules for the governance of the corporation."'
Over recent years, however, shareholders have increasingly used
bylaws as a means to augment their power,' a development rendered possible
by two core features of the DGCL's general grant of bylaw authority. First,
in stark contrast with other major corporate decisions (including mergers,
sales of substantially all assets, charter amendments, and dissolution), which
shareholders generally lack the power to initiate,' shareholders can adopt,
amend, or repeal bylaws unilaterally-and this power cannot be taken away.
Section 109(a) says that "the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall
be in the stockholders entitled to vote," and that while the charter may
extend this power to the board as well, it may not limit the shareholders' own
bylaw authority.' In a corporate governance system forcing most decisions
3DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b)-(c), (f)-(i) (2010).
4 1d. § 211 (a)-(b), (d).
5See, e.g., R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, form 1.17 (3d ed. 2009) (including provisions
addressing shareholder meetings; the board of directors and committees thereof; officers; stock;
indemnification; and "miscellaneous" provisions regarding notice, bylaw amendments, and so on).
'See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 92 (2d ed. 2007).
'See Brett H. McDonnell, Bylaw Reforms for Delaware's Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 651, 651-52 (2008).
81n each case, the decision must be proposed by the board. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§
251(c) (mergers), 271(a) (sales of substantially all assets), 242(b) (charter amendments), 275(b)
(dissolution). But see id. § 275(c) (permitting shareholders to dissolve the corporation unilaterally,
but only by unanimous vote).
9 d. § 109(a) (emphasis added). The intention of the 1974 amendment to section 109(a)
was, in fact, to clarify that a charter provision granting the board bylaw authority would not have the
effect of depriving the shareholders of this power. See EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE
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through the board, this unique mode of unilateral action provides an obvious
window of opportunity for shareholders looking to impact corporate affairs.
Indeed, it is rendered even more attractive by another core feature of
Delaware's bylaw statute-the open-ended nature of this grant of power.
Section 109(b) says that "bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent
with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of
the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the
rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.""o
Taken at face value, section 109 would appear to offer shareholders the
unilateral (and inalienable) ability to rewrite the rules of corporate
governance on a company-by-company basis as, and when, they see fit.
B. Section 109's Limits
Section 109's grant of power is not, however, without limits. While
broadly permitting bylaws "relating to the business of the corporation" and
"the conduct of its affairs"-and even contemplating bylaws affecting "the
rights or powers" of directors-section 109(b) states that bylaws may not be
"inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation."" This
reflects a long-standing hierarchical conception of forms of corporate
authority. As the Delaware Court of Chancery explained in 1929:
[W]ith respect to corporations the law of their being is
characterized by gradation of authority. That which is superior
overrides all below it in rank. The by-laws must succumb to
the superior authority of the charter; the charter if it conflicts
with the statute must give way; and the statute, if it conflicts
with the constitution, is void.12
While bylaws trump board resolutions-uch that "a board cannot
override a bylaw requirement by merely adopting a resolution" -- bylaws are
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 109.1 (5th ed. 2010).
'
0DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (emphasis added).
"See id.
12Gaskill v. Gladys Belle Oil Co., 146 A. 337, 340 (Del. Ch. 1929). See also Airgas, Inc. v.
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1189 (Del. 2010) ("It is settled Delaware law that a
bylaw that is inconsistent with the corporation's charter is invalid.").
13Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080 (Del. Ch. 2004). For additional
background on the status of board resolutions and policies, see Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 2005
WL 3529317, *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005) (observing that while board resolutions and policies are
generally revocable, their adoption and maintenance may be the subject of an enforceable contract);
see also generally Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp.'s
Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2010) (analyzing News Corp.'s reincorporation in
2011] 7
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themselves unquestionably trumped by contrary provisions in the charter and
the statute, rendering them "the least fundamental of the corporation's
'constitutional' documents."l4 The bylaws' low position on the totem pole is
further reflected in section 102(b)(1), stating that anything "required or
permitted . . . to be stated in the bylaws may instead be stated in the
certificate of incorporation""--but not vice versa.
With respect to the shareholders' bylaw authority, then, the hierarchy
reflected in section 109(b) could impose substantial limitations indeed, given
the enormous grant of power to Delaware boards under the statute and
(through it) the charter-though the nature of these limits remains far from
clear, given the ambiguity and circularity of the relevant DGCL provisions.
Section 141(a) says that the "business and affairs of every corporation ...
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors" unless the
statute or the charter says otherwise." Correspondingly, section 102(b)(1)
contemplates inclusion in the charter of " [a]ny provision for the management
of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any
provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the
corporation, the directors, and the stockholders."" These provisions broadly
suggest that limits on the board's ability to manage the business and affairs
of the corporation are to appear in the charter, not the bylaws. It is unclear
how far this logic goes, however, because section 109(b) itself contemplates
bylaws at least "relating" to the corporation's business and
affairs'"-whatever that means. Confusion regarding the interaction between
sections 109 and 141, in particular, is compounded by what Jeffrey Gordon
famously called the "recursive loop."l9 Section 141(a)'s grant of power to the
board "permits variations 'otherwise provided' in the chapter, which includes
section 109, a broad source of shareholder power-but whose use cannot be
'inconsistent with' the charter or the law, meaning-and here the circle starts
again-section 141(a)."20
Delaware, the ensuing litigation, and the relative weakness of Delaware shareholder rights relative to
those in News Corp.'s native Australia).
14ALLEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 92; see also BALOTr & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 1-
15; 1 DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.03 (2009);
WELCH ET AL., supra note 9, §§ 109.5.1-.5.2.
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1).
Id. § 141(a).
71d. § 102(b)(1).
"Id. § 109(b).
'
9Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills and Shareholder-
Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 546 (1997).
20d. at 547; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change
the Outcome ofCorporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605,607-08 (1997); Brett H.
McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY Bus.
8 [Vol. 36
MANAGING CORPORATE FEDERALISM
It is widely recognized that the statute itself provides no clear means
of reconciling these provisions." In discrete areas the DGCL explicitly
envisions certain forms of bylaws considered favorable to shareholders,
including majority voting requirements," the ability to include board
nominees in the corporation's proxy statement,23 and reimbursement of
shareholders' election-related proxy expenses.24 Outside these discrete areas,
however, confusion reigns."
Indeed, aside from the collision with section 141, there is also the
simultaneity of shareholder and board bylaw authority under section 109
itself to reckon with.26 While at common law only shareholders could amend
bylaws, many corporate law statutes later permitted the board to be granted
concurrent power in the charter-an approach reflected in DGCL section
109(a).27 This, of course, "raises the prospect of cycling amendments and
L.J. 205,213-15 (2005). But see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-
Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 429-33 (1998) (contesting
Gordon's reading and arguing that "section 141(a) is more naturally read to refer to statutes which
address its specific subject matter-the allocation of managerial power to the board of
directors-and which clearly and explicitly depart from that allocation by providing for management
by persons other than directors").
21See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence ofCorporate Law, 59 ALA.
L. REV. 1385, 1423-24, 1444-47 (2008); Coffee, supra note 20, at 606-08; McDonnell, supra note
20, at 213-15; Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Towarda New Theory ofthe Shareholder
Role: "Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 319-20 (2001). On the
approach subsequently taken by the Delaware Supreme Court, see infra notes 72-75 and
accompanying text.
22DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216. Majority voting requirements enhance shareholder power
by transforming votes withheld into votes against a given candidate. Under the plurality voting
requirement that otherwise applies to board elections by default, a single vote would be sufficient to
elect an unopposed candidate. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES
AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 24:84.30 (2010), available at Westlaw SECFEDCORP.
.
23DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112. Shareholder rights advocates viewed section 112's
adoption as an effort to preempt an anticipated federal proxy access rule by permitting ownership
thresholds to be established in the bylaws at a higher level than those anticipated in the federal rule.
See J. Robert Brown, The SEC, Access and the Need to Preempt Delaware Law, THE RACE TO THE
BoTTOM, (Apr. 23, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-
law/the-sec-access-and-the-need-to-preempt-delaware-law.html. The effort was unsuccessful. See
infra notes 146-152 and accompanying text.
24DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113.
25The lack of clarity described above is further reflected elsewhere in the DGCL. For
example, section 121 indicates that a corporation's powers are to be exercised by "its officers,
directors and stockholders." Id § 12 1(a). As Balotti and Finkelstein observe, however, the statute
provides no guidance on the allocation of these powers, effectively leaving this to discrete sections
of the DGCL and, in the many circumstances lacking such specification, to the charter, bylaws, and
common law. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 2-2. Likewise, section 122 gives the
corporation power to "[aldopt, amend and repeal bylaws," again without further guidance as to when
or by whom. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(6).26DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, Id. § 109.271d § 109(a). See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 15 (2d ed. 2009).
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counter-amendments"-say, a shareholder bylaw invading the board's turf in
some respect, to which the board responds by simply repealing the offensive
bylaw.28 Today, new Delaware corporations typically permit the board to
enact, amend, and repeal bylaws pursuant to section 109(a),29 yet the statute
leaves entirely unclear how shareholder and board bylaws relate to one
another--notably whether (and if so, how) a shareholder bylaw might be
insulated from board amendment or repeal. While section 216 provides that
a shareholder bylaw establishing "the votes that shall be necessary for the
election of directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of
directors,"" it is unclear what, if any, implication can be drawn regarding the
myriad other types of bylaws shareholders might enact. Section 216 "might
create a negative implication that the board can amend or repeal other kinds
of shareholder bylaws"-or not." This, like numerous other bylaw-related
issues, awaits judicial resolution.32
C. The National Landscape
It is worth pausing at this point to observe that the ambiguity and
circularity discussed above is not unique to Delaware's corporate statute.
While there is certainly variation across the states, most fall into one of two
broad camps, as the tables in the appendix suggest--the Delaware approach,
and the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) approach. Seven other
states appear generally to follow Delaware,33 while thirty-four states appear
to have modeled their bylaw statutes on section 10.20 of the MBCA.34 As
between the two, the MBCA approach differs principally in that it reverses
the default rule on board bylaw authority (i.e., providing that the board
possesses such power unless the charter says otherwise), and it binds the
board's hands where "the shareholders in amending, repealing, or adopting a
bylaw expressly provide that the board of directors may not amend, repeal,
or reinstate that bylaw."" In this manner, the MBCA approach offers a clear
28BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 16. See also Hamermesh, supra note 20, at 467-75;
McDonnell, supra note 7, at 664-65.
29See, e.g., DREXLER ET AL., supra note 14, § 9.02; Hamermesh, supra note 20, at 468-70.
3
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216.
3
'McDonnell, supra note 7, at 665.
32See id. (observing that the legislative history explicitly disavows any such intention).
33See infra Appendix Table 1; see also infra note 262 (describing salient Delaware features
and variations among certain of these states).
34See infra Appendix Table 2; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20.
3sMODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b); see also infra note 263. As to the remaining statutes,
some appear to be modeled on § 27 of the 1969 Model Business Corporation Act (with variations),
the salient features of which include board bylaw authority "unless reserved to the shareholders" in
10 [Vol. 36
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solution to the "cycling amendments" problem described above."
It should be recalled, however, that notwithstanding the large number
of states following the MBCA approach, Delaware alone accounts for over
50 percent of U.S. publicly traded companies and 63 percent of the Fortune
500." Consequently, the "cycling amendments" problem remains an
important issue for much of corporate America." It should also be observed
that, like in Delaware, the MBCA offers little guidance on the distinct issue
of the permissible scope of bylaws, and particularly the degree to which
shareholders may carve back the board's power through bylaw amendments.
MBCA section 2.06(b) similarly requires that bylaws not be "inconsistent
with law or the articles of incorporation," adding in a comment that this
"precludes provisions that limit the managerial authority of directors that is
established by section 8.01(b)," yet provides no more concrete guidance on
their interaction than DGCL sections 109 and 141." Under each of the
predominant models, then, the balance of board and shareholder bylaw
power has been left almost entirely to the courts to determine.
D. Delaware's (Murky) Bylaw Jurisprudence
What guidance have the Delaware courts offered in this area? Recent
developments will be discussed below,40 but at most a few significant
the charter, and inalienable shareholder authority to amend or repeal board bylaws. See infra
Appendix Table 3 and note 264; 1969 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 27. Others vary considerably. See
infra Appendix Table 4 and note 265.
36See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 16. Note that certain states generally following other
approaches favor shareholders either by explicitly permitting them to amend or repeal board bylaws,
or by requiring affirmative authorization for the board to amend or repeal a shareholder bylaw. See
infra notes 262-265.
"See Division ofCorporations-AboutAgency, DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS,
http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last updated May 27, 2010); see also Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over
Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 565-68 (2002).
38See Brett H. McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder Proxy Access, 43 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 33), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1537211
(observing that Delaware's rules regarding "the scope of valid bylaws are more important by far than
the rules of any other state, and quite possibly more important than the rules of all other states
combined").
39MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.06(b) and Official Comment; see also MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 8.01(b). While the comment to section 2.06(b) might seem to suggest that shareholder bylaws
simply cannot limit board power in any way, this is implausible for the reason identified by the
Delaware Supreme Court - "[t]hat reasoning, taken to its logical extreme, would result in
eliminating altogether the shareholders' statutory right to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws" because
"by their very nature, [they] set down rules and procedures that bind a corporation's board and its
shareholders." CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emp. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del. 2008). Hence
some balance must inevitably be struck. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
4See infra notes 67-96 and accompanying text.
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principles emerge from the case law prior to 2008. Consistent with the
hierarchical view of corporate authority discussed above,4 ' the Delaware
Court of Chancery, in its Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp. opinion,
suggested in 1933 that "as the charter is an instrument in which the broad
and general aspects of the corporate entity's existence and nature are defined,
so the by-laws are generally regarded as the proper place for the self-
imposed rules and regulations deemed expedient for its convenient
functioning to be laid down."42 Here the court suggests that, at least as of the
1930s, bylaws related not to matters implicating the corporation's core
"nature," but rather more mundane matters implicating its "convenient
functioning" in the day-to-day sense.43
The hierarchical view of corporate authority further animates the
Delaware Supreme Court's conclusion that bylaws must be consistent with
common law and "reasonable in their application."" In its famous Schnell v.
Chris-Craft Industries opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated a
bedrock principle of modem Delaware corporate law, namely that
"inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally
possible"-one consequence being that technically valid bylaw amendments
may nevertheless be struck down by the court if done for "inequitable
purposes. "" Hence, in Frantz Manufacturing Company v. EACIndustries, a
new controller's amendment of the bylaws (i.e., after control was secured) to
place various restrictions on the target board was held valid because the
court deemed this "a permissible part of [its] attempt to avoid its
disenfranchisement as a majority shareholder."46 In Schnell itself, by
contrast, the board's amendment of the bylaws to advance the date of the
annual shareholders meeting was struck down because the board's action was
41See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
42Gow v. Consol. Copper Mines Corp., 165 A. 136, 140 (Del. Ch. 1933) (emphasis added).
43This, for the Gow court, included setting the number of directors on the board. See id. at
139-40. Recall that the DGCL itself now confirms that this subject may be addressed in the bylaws.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(b).
"Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985); see also BALOTTI &
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 1-15 to -17.
4sSchnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); see also Hollinger
Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080-81 (Del. Ch. 2004); WELCH ET AL., supra note 9, § 109.6.
"Frantz, 501 A.2d at 407. The bylaw amendments at issue in Frantz required that all
directors be present for any board action, that there be a single class of directors, that a unanimous
vote be required for all board action (including ratifying committee action), and that indemnification
of directors be approved by the stockholders. Id. at 405. The controller's fears proved to be well
founded, as the target board attempted to regain control by issuing treasury shares to an employee
stock ownership plan (diluting the new controller). The target board's action was itself found to be
invalid, however, because its primary purpose was "to perpetuate their control of the company,"
violating Schnell. Id. at 402, 407-09.
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undertaken "for the purpose of perpetuating itself in office" (i.e., by making
a proxy contest more difficult).47
Notwithstanding the position of bylaws at or near the bottom of the
hierarchy of corporate authority, however, the Delaware Supreme Court has
described "[t]he power to make and amend the bylaws of a corporation" as
"an inherent feature of the corporate structure."48 Thus, while bylaws most
assuredly must be consistent with all superior forms of corporate
authority-the charter, the statute, the common law, and so on-the
Delaware Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he bylaws of a corporation are
presumed to be valid," meaning that "the courts will construe the bylaws in a
manner consistent with the law rather than strike down the bylaws."49 This, I
will argue below, is an important principle that appears to be eroding in light
of recent developments at both the state and federal levels.s0
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Delaware case law prior to
2008, however, is that it offers no guidance whatever regarding the core
questions of board and shareholder power discussed above. To a great
extent, this reflects the fact that shareholders' use of bylaws as a means of
asserting substantial control over publicly held corporations is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Franklin Balotti and Jesse Finkelstein observe that
"vigorous debate" regarding the ability of shareholders to limit board power
through bylaw amendments arose only in the 1990s" in response to the
overwhelming victory of boards in the hostile takeover battles of the late
1980s. In a series of opinions coming down between 1985 and 1990, the
Delaware Supreme Court created a takeover regime in which boards have a
clear duty to maximize return to shareholders only in the narrow
circumstance where the corporation faces an "inevitable" sale, break-up, or
change of control -a framework leaving the board enormous discretion in
all other circumstances to implement defensive measures such as poison
pills." Critically, the court even held that target boards could keep such
47Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439.
48Frantz, 501 A.2d at 407.
491d. (emphasis added).
50See infra notes 195-215 and accompanying text.
"See BALOTrI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 1-18.
52See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986);
Paramount Commc'ns v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,43-44 (Del. 1994) (applying this duty in
the context of a change of control).
13See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (permitting
defensive measures where the board can demonstrate that there were "reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed" and that the defenses employed
were "reasonable in relation to the threat posed"); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1350, 1354 (Del. 1985) (validating preemptive use of poison pills under Unocal); Versata Enter.,
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defenses in place and refuse to negotiate with hostile bidders-even those
making all-cash, all-shares bids at substantial premia-in order to protect
their own long-term business plans, concluding that "the selection of a time
frame for achievement of corporate goals" is entirely within the board's
discretion.54 For lack of any effective means of policing boards' use of
takeover defenses, the unique statutory authority to act unilaterally in
enacting bylaws naturally recommended itself to shareholders seeking to
reassert themselves in this and other areas of corporate governance."
So in the 1990s shareholders began to test the degree to which their
bylaw authority could be used to carve back the board's power"--an issue on
which Delaware law remains murky today." As a threshold matter, recall
Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 599-607 (Del. 2010) (applying Unocal and Moran in upholding
validity of a particularly restrictive pill implemented to protect the value of net operating losses).
Shareholders' rights plans, colloquially called "poison pills," work by attaching rights to common
stock permitting purchase of deeply discounted shares when a stated ownership threshold (perhaps
15-20 percent) is exceeded by another stockholder without the board's approval. The poison pill
threatens dilution of the would-be hostile acquirer because such rights are not exercisable by the
person triggering them. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 536-39.
54Paramount Conimc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149-54 (Del. 1990). Chancellor
Chandler expresses a dim view of this approach in his eBay opinion, rejecting use of a poison pill in
a purported effort to protect the "corporate culture" of Craigslist (in which eBay held a minority
stake, but desired control) into the indefinite future. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,
2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 187, *80-*90 (Del. Ch. 2010). Chancellor Chandler's opinion strongly
emphasizes the interests of shareholders, though he acknowledges that the case involved "a unique
set of facts heretofore not seen in the context of a challenge to a rights plan" - notably, a poison pill
implemented by controllers of a closely held corporation, who openly disavowed "revenue
maximization" as a corporate aim. Id. at *44-*45, *77-*78, *90. In this light, the case offers little
guidance on the permissible use of defensive measures in widely held public corporations. Cf
Bruner, supra note 21, at 1418-19 (observing the limited significance of the emphasis placed on
shareholders' interests in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), which responded
to similarly unusual facts).
For additional background on Delaware's approach to hostile takeovers, and the anti-
takeover statutes enacted in other states, see Bruner, supra note 21, at 1415-18; Christopher M.
Bruner, Power and Purpose in the "Anglo-American" Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 579,596-99,
639-41 (2010).
"See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 19, at 544 ("The pressure to test the limits of shareholder
bylaw authority over poison pills arises now [i.e. 1997] both because of judicial rulings that have
augmented their preclusive effect, and because of the rise of institutional activism in the governance
arena .... ); McDonnell, supra note 20, at 209 ("In the nineties shareholders tried to enact bylaws
limiting the ability of boards to adopt and maintain poison pills."); cf Securities and Exchange
Commission, Roundtable Discussions Regarding the Federal Proxy Rules and State Corporation
Law 220, May 7, 2007, available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxy-
transcript0507O7.pdf [hereinafter SEC, Roundtable Discussions] (Joseph Grundfest characterizing
the larger debate regarding shareholder proposals in the corporation's proxy statement as "the knock-
on effect of us having stifled the hostile takeover market").
56The manner in which shareholders have endeavored to do so will be discussed below in
connection with the federal securities regime governing their ability to include proposals in the
corporation's proxy statement. See infra notes 155-182 and accompanying text.
"See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 93; Robert B. Thompson, Defining the Shareholder's
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that whether Delaware shareholders can insulate bylaws from subsequent
amendment or repeal by the board is not addressed in the statute, and the
case law provides essentially no guidance on this issue. In her 1984 opinion
in American International Rent a Car v. Cross, then-Vice Chancellor Berger
found no violation of Schnell where a board, fearing a failed vote at the
shareholders' meeting, simply passed the desired bylaw itself during the
lunch recess-though Berger appears to have believed that "several
recourses" remained available to the shareholders, including further
"amending the bylaws and, as part of the amendment, . . . remov[ing] from
the Board the power to further amend the provision in question."" Later
Court of Chancery opinions, however, suggest that whether boards may
subsequently amend or repeal shareholder bylaws purporting to curtail the
board's power remains unclear. In 1999, Vice Chancellor Strine observed in
General Datacomm Industries v. State of Wisconsin Investment Board that
"whether a stockholder-approved bylaw may be repealed by a board of
directors with [section 109(a)] authority has not clearly been answered by a
Delaware Court."" Likewise Vice Chancellor Lamb, citing the foregoing
cases in his 2006 opinion in Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., noted that the issue
remained unresolved."
In 1990, the Delaware Supreme Court held, in Centaur Partners, IVv.
National Intergroup, that a proposed shareholder bylaw setting the number
of directors and prohibiting the board from subsequently amending or
repealing it "would be a nullity if adopted" because the company's charter
provided that "the number of directors of the Corporation shall be fixed by
and may from time to time be altered as provided in the By-Laws." 6' This,
the court explained, meant that the proposed shareholder bylaw would be
"inconsistent with" the charter, violating DGCL section 109(b), because the
charter granted bylaw authority to the board pursuant to section 109(a).62
The court's analysis in Centaur Partners may tend to suggest that
shareholder bylaws aimed at curtailing board power may simply be amended
or repealed subsequently by the board, though the opinion does not squarely
answer this question, focusing rather on the validity of the shareholder bylaw
in light of the charter provision addressing the number of directors (which
Role, Defining a Role for State Law: Folk at 40, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 771, 776 (2008).
58American Int'l Rent A Car, Inc. v. Cross, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 413, *5-*9 (Del. Ch.
1984). The bylaw amendment at issue raised the stock ownership limit for American's licensees,
permitting a new financing plan to be pursued. Id. at *2-*4.
"Gen. Datacomm Indus., Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821 n. 1 (Del.
Ch. 1999).
"Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 742-43 (Del. Ch. 2006).
6 Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat'l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 929 (Del. 1990).
621d
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the court interprets as "grant[ing] the board broad authority to fix the number
of directors, which power may be exercised from time to time through the
adoption of by-laws")."
The case law likewise has shed little light on the distinct issue of the
degree to which shareholder bylaws may, as a substantive matter, carve back
board power. As noted above, there was little practical reason to tackle this
subject directly until relatively recently, though the cases have long
suggested that shareholder bylaws may restrain the board in non-trivial ways.
In Gow, for example, the court explained in 1933 that the ability to set the
number of directors in the bylaws "makes it possible for the stockholders to
effect a radical change in the personnel of the board of directors more
expeditiously than they could if the number were a subject of regulation by
the charter," but that "this consideration is of no moment"-demonstrating
only that "the Legislature evidently regarded it as sound policy that the
control of the corporation should at all times be subject to a fairly quick
response to the [shareholders'] wishes."" In a similar spirit, in SEC v.
Transamerica Corporation, the Third Circuit in 1947 rejected the notion
that a Delaware charter provision vesting "all powers of corporate
management" in the board rendered improper a proposed shareholder bylaw
mandating independent public auditors." More recently, Vice Chancellor
Strine observed in his 2004 Hollinger opinion that section 109 "[b]y its plain
terms . .. provides stockholders with a broad right to adopt bylaws," which
"could impose severe requirements on the conduct of a board without
running afoul of the DGCL."66
E. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan
In its 2008 opinion in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan,
the Delaware Supreme Court took a more concerted look at the degree to
which shareholder bylaws may carve back board power. In June 2008, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the first time certified
questions to the court pursuant to a 2007 amendment to the Delaware
Constitution permitting certification." AFSCME sought to include in the
631d; Gen. Datacomm Indus., 731 A.2d at 821 n. 1; Bebchuk, 902 A.2d at 743 & n.37; see
also BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 1-18 to -20; DREXLER ET AL., supra note 14, § 9.02;
WELCH ET AL., supra note 9, § 109.3.3.
"Gow v. Consol. Copper Mines Corp., 165 A. 136, 141-42 (Del. Ch. 1933).
61SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 516-17 (3d Cir. 1947).
"Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078-79 (Del. Ch. 2004).
67CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emp. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227,229 (Del. 2008); see also DEL.
CONST. art. IV, § 11(8) (granting the Delaware Supreme Court jurisdiction "[t]o hear and determine
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company's proxy statement a proposed bylaw that, if adopted, would require
the board, under certain circumstances, to reimburse shareholder proxy
expenses incurred in nominating a short slate of board candidates." The
SEC's two questions for the court related to potential bases for excluding
AFSCME's proposed bylaw from the proxy statement under Securities
Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, each of which turned on Delaware corporate law.
The first question was whether the proposed bylaw was "a proper subject for
action by [Delaware] shareholders," and the second question was whether
the bylaw, if adopted, would otherwise cause the company to violate
Delaware law."9
The impact on the court's analysis of the manner in which these
questions were put to it-i.e., their certification by the SEC to assess the
excludability of a proposed bylaw from the company's proxy-will be
assessed in some detail below.70 To facilitate the analysis that follows,
however, I summarize the court's conclusions here. " On the first
question-whether the proposed bylaw was "a proper subject for action by
[Delaware] shareholders"-the court took a relatively expansive view of the
legitimate scope of shareholder bylaws. Acknowledging that determining
the degree to which shareholder bylaws can restrain board authority "is an
elusively difficult task,"" Justice Jacobs framed the first inquiry as being
whether the bylaw would "facially violate any provision of the DGCL or of
CA's Certificate of Incorporation."" This, of course, required reckoning
with the "recursive loop" created by sections 109(b) and 141(a).74 Justice
Jacobs broke the loop in favor of section 141(a), and thus the board,
concluding that "[b]ecause the board's managerial authority under Section
141(a) is a cardinal precept of the DGCL," section 109(b) would not be
construed as limiting section 141(a), while section 141(a) would be
construed as limiting section 109(b)."
Justice Jacobs flatly rejected CA, Inc.'s contention that shareholder
bylaws could in no way limit board authority, however, because this
questions of law certified to it by . .. the United States Securities and Exchange Commission").
CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 229-30.
''Id. at 231. On AFSCME's long campaign for proxy access, see BLOOMENTHAL &
WOLFF, supra note 22, §§ 24:71.20-.26. On the proxy access rule ultimately adopted, see infra
notes 146-152 and accompanying text.
70See infra notes 195-215 and accompanying text.
"For additional analysis of the case, see generally Christopher M. Bruner, Shareholder
Bylaws and the Delaware Corporation, 11 TRANSACTIONS 67 (2009).
72CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 232.
73Id at 238.
74See id at 232 ("Section 109(a) does not exist in a vacuum. It must be read together with 8
Del. C. § 141(a).. . .").
"Id at 232 & n.7.
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approach, "taken to its logical extreme, would result in eliminating altogether
the shareholders' statutory right to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws." 6
Observing that the relevant statutes and preexisting case law offered no
discernible "bright line," rendering the court's decision "case specific,"
Justice Jacobs nevertheless endorsed a distinction (widely recognized by
academics and practitioners) between procedural and substantive bylaws, the
former being permissible while the latter are not." Stating the issue to be
"whether the Bylaw is one that establishes or regulates a process for
substantive director decision-making, or one that mandates the decision
itself," the court concluded that the proposed bylaw had "both the intent and
the effect of regulating the process for electing directors of CA," and thus
was a proper subject for action by Delaware shareholders."
AFSCME fared less well, however, on the second question-whether
the bylaw, if adopted, would otherwise cause the company to violate
Delaware law. Here, the court focused on the common law and concluded
that a mandatory proxy reimbursement bylaw could force the board to breach
its fiduciary duties in circumstances where the board concluded that
reimbursement in any amount would be inconsistent with the best interests
of the company." Explaining that the questions certified by the SEC
"request a determination of the validity of the Bylaw in the abstract," the
court determined that it "must necessarily consider any possible
circumstance under which a board of directors might be required to act. "80
Observing that "[u]nder at least one such hypothetical, the board of directors
would breach their fiduciary duties if they complied with the Bylaw," the
court concluded that AFSCME's bylaw, if enacted, "would violate the
prohibition . . . against contractual arrangements that commit the board of
directors to a course of action that would preclude them from fully
discharging their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.""
Citing to cases that involved board action precluding it from
discharging its fiduciary duties-pecifically, the "no shop" merger
'61d. at 234.
n7 CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 234-36; see also Frederick H. Alexander & James D. Honaker,
Power to the Franchise or the Fiduciaries?: An Analysis of the Limits on Stockholder Activist
Bylaws, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 749, 750-52 (2008); Bruner, supra note 71, at 69; Coffee, supra note
20, at 613-15; McDonnell, supra note 7, at 660-6 1; McDonnell, supra note 20, at 216-18; Eric S.
Wilensky & Angela L. Priest, Corporate Governance Developments in a Recessionary
Environment, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 921, at 5 (May 18, 2009). But see Hamermesh,
supra note 20, at 428-44 (rejecting this approach).
"CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 234-36.
'
9See id. at 238.
gId.
811d.
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provision at issue in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network,
Inc., and the "delayed redemption" poison pill at issue in Quickturn Design
Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro"L-the court rejected the notion that shareholder-
imposed constraints on the board should be treated differently. AFSCME
endeavored to characterize the bylaw not as mandating violation of fiduciary
duties, but as relieving the board of its duties in the area of proxy
reimbursement." The court, however, dismissed this argument as "more
semantical than substantive."' Effectively shareholders desiring such a
bylaw have three options following CA, Inc. They can include a fiduciary-
out provision;" seek to amend the charter (which, of course, would require
board approval);" or "seek recourse from the Delaware General Assembly.""
While CA, Inc. offers some limited guidance on the permissible scope
of shareholder bylaws through its effective endorsement of the procedural-
substantive distinction, the practical difficulty of identifying any coherent
"bright line," coupled with the court's resort to the board's fiduciary duties as
an evaluative principle, leave numerous questions unanswered." Given the
origins of the bylaw debate discussed above, one of the most consequential
issues in this area is the permissibility of shareholder bylaws curtailing the
board's ability to deploy takeover defenses." Lucian Bebchuk, as a
821d. at 238-39; Paramount Commc'n Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994);
Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
"CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 239.
mId at 239-40.
85A fiduciary out provision-permitting the board to avoid the requirement in question
where necessary to comply with its fiduciary duties-has effectively been mandated in other such
circumstances. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936-39 (Del.
2003) (citing Paramount Commc'n Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)). This may
not be so bad for shareholders, as availing itself of the provision could prove costly to the board
reputationally and prompt distracting litigation. See McDonnell, supra note 38, at 46-47.
86DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b).
87CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240. Interestingly, on the specific issue of proxy expense
reimbursement bylaws, the relationship between the court's holding in CA, Inc. and the recently
enacted § 113 remains uncertain. While section 113 clearly permits such bylaws, its list of potential
"procedures or conditions" does not reference the board's fiduciary duties. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, §
113. It thus remains unclear whether section 113 "overrides" the CA, Inc. requirement that the board
have discretion to deny reimbursement altogether. See Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Corporate
Governance ofDelaware Corporations: Delaware Adopts Amendments to the Delaware General
Corporation Law Relating to Corporate Governance, at 4 (Apr. 28, 2009), available at
http/vww.sullem com/files/Publication/07c46b24fa94942-af0a5694e0d9f461PrmntaioPublcation
Atinchment/ca563f25-9583-4c9b-9f67-59510f78f260/SCPublica mCoxrate Govemanceof Delaware
Corporations.pdf; see also Wilensky & Priest, supra note 77 (observing that as "an opt-in statute,"
the board could repeal a section 113 shareholder bylaw).
88See Bruner, supra note 71, at 72-74.
89See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 623-24.
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shareholder of CA, Inc., sought a declaratoryjudgment in 2006 regarding the
validity of a proposed bylaw requiring that adoption or extension of a poison
pill either be approved by the shareholders or be re-approved annually by
unanimous vote of the board.o Amendment or repeal of the bylaw itself
likewise would require a unanimous vote of the board." Vice Chancellor
Lamb, observing that "the validity of stockholder bylaws which limit a board
of director's exercise of one of its powers" raises an issue "fraught with
tension," suggested that such a bylaw might survive," yet refused to provide
declaratory relief on ripeness grounds, explaining that "[t]he key event
necessary to vest jurisdiction in this court is the adoption of the proposed
bylaw."" Ultimately, Bebchuk's bylaw received 41 percent of the vote at the
CA, Inc. annual meeting in September 2006, thus failing and leaving the
question unanswered." The Delaware Supreme Court's more recent (and
unrelated) decision in CA, Inc. has led some to speculate (quite reasonably)
that pill bylaws of this sort would be unlikely to survive without a fiduciary-
out provision," but the matter remains unresolved."
F. Delaware's Ambivalence
Perhaps the most important takeaway from CA, Inc. is that in
answering questions like this, trying to divine the intrinsic nature of
"bylaws" is essentially a red herring. Put differently, the core debate here is
not really about bylaws in themselves, but rather about what the division of
power between shareholders and boards in Delaware corporations ought to
be. To be sure, there have long been indirect indications that testing the
validity of bylaws was about something more than ascertaining what bylaws
"are" in some metaphysical sense. For example, the prohibition against
using bylaws to arbitrarily or unreasonably impinge on shareholder rights"
necessarily means that there must be some underlying metric or balance of
power against which to evaluate them, regardless of whatever the "bylaw"
concept itself may signify. CA, Inc. accordingly reveals-at least indirectly,
90Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 738-39 (Del. Ch. 2006).
91Md.
92Id at 742-43.
9 Id. at 740-42.
94See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 624.
"sSee, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 7, at 664.
96See Wilensky & Priest, supra note 77, at 14.
9 7See BALOTH & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 1.10. The fact that "amendments to the by-
laws can occur in certain situations through custom and usage," id. § 1.11, similarly casts doubt on
the notion that elucidating the meaning of the term "bylaw" could be expected to illuminate core
questions implicated by their use.
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through its mode of analysis-that the contemporary bylaw debate implicates
the same core questions of corporate power and purpose that were raised by
the 1980s takeover debate, out of which it grew.
The similarities between the takeover debate and the contemporary
bylaw debate, and likewise the similarities between the judicial responses to
them, are indeed quite striking. In each case, board power is challenged by
what we might term a nascent shareholder right. Hostile tender offers in the
1980s built on the long-standing right of shareholders unilaterally to sell
their stock," but put this to a novel and powerful use with the potential to
destabilize the long-standing balance of power in Delaware corporations.
The same can be said of the new uses to which the right of shareholders
unilaterally to enact bylaws has been put, these new bylaws bearing no more
resemblance to the old bylaws than hostile tender offers do to garden variety
stock sales. Bylaws seeking to restrain the use of takeover defenses, to pry
open the proxy machinery, and so forth, similarly challenge fundamental
corporate power arrangements and therefore raise anew the fundamental
issue of corporate purpose-the aims and intended beneficiaries of corporate
activity."
I have argued in prior work that Delaware corporate law has long
remained deeply ambivalent regarding the appropriate role of shareholders in
corporate governance, and likewise the degree to which corporate decision-
making should focus on the shareholders' interests.'o Delaware's
ambivalence regarding shareholder power manifests itself, for example, in
limits on the shareholder franchise (notably the inability to remove directors
from a staggered board other than for cause); the shareholders' inability to
initiate fundamental actions (e.g., mergers, charter amendments) or to accept
hostile tender offers without interference; and of course the fog surrounding
the shareholders' bylaw authority."' Ambivalence regarding the degree to
which shareholder wealth maximization ought to be the aim of corporate
decision-making manifests itself in the lack of a clear duty to maximize
shareholder wealth in any but the most limited circumstances; a hostile
98While the Delaware statute does not provide explicitly for free transferability, it is implicit
in § 202, which requires that restrictions on transfer be "noted conspicuously on the [stock]
certificate." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(a); Thompson & Smith, supra note 21, at 276 n.83.
"See Bruner, supra note 21, at 1408-32; Bruner, supra note 71, at 73-74; Gordon, supra
note 19, generally (exploring how takeover defenses and shareholder bylaws similarly raise "far-
reaching questions on the distribution of power between shareholders and the board"); Thompson &
Smith, supra note 21, at 314-23 (exploring hostile takeovers and shareholder bylaws as contexts
similarly "illustrating shareholder-director conflict").
'"See generally Bruner, supra note 21. See also Bruner, supra note 54 (contrasting this
ambivalence with the clear shareholder orientation of U.K. company law).
1o'See Bruner, supra note 21, at 1421-24; Bruner, supra note 54, at 593-97.
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takeover regime that-in addition to permitting interference with shareholder
decision-making-actually permits boards some degree of latitude to
consider the interests of other constituencies; and a somewhat murky
statement of fiduciary duties owed simultaneously "to the corporation and its
stockholders."0 2
These forms of ambivalence regarding shareholders stand out most
starkly in contrast with U.S. corporate law's closest relative, U.K. company
law, which by statute clearly defines the purpose of the corporation as being
to promote the shareholders' interests, and which favors shareholders with
(among other things) far greater power to remove directors without cause;
initiate charter amendments; compel board action; and approve (or
disapprove) the use of takeover defenses."' The critical difference, I have
argued, lies in the fact that we in the United States have relied on public
corporations to pull substantially more weight-notably including the
provision of critical social welfare protections (such as health and retirement
benefits) often provided directly by the state in other countries-which has
resulted in far greater political pressure being brought to bear on U.S.
corporate governance to accommodate non-shareholders' interests.'"
To stay with the comparative perspective for a moment, the
fundamental ambivalence that Delaware bylaws represent is clearly reflected
in the fact that other common law-oriented, capital market-based corporate
legal systems appear to have no use for this bizarre form of governance
instrument, into which the shareholders and the board alike may lob
amendments-seemingly willy-nilly-with no coherent rules establishing
their priority. The U.K. Companies Act (2006) simply provides that
shareholders in a public corporation can unilaterally amend the company's
"constitution"-the core governance document-by special resolution of a
75 percent majority,"' firmly "plac[ing] the shareholders at the centre of the
102See Bruner, supra note 21, at 1424-27; Bruner, supra note 54, at 597-603.
03See Bruner, supra note 54, at 603-11.
1See generally Bruner, supra note 54. See also Bruner, supra note 21, at 1427-32. For
analysis of the role that this distinction has played in conditioning the two countries' corporate
governance reforms in the wake of the financial crisis, see generally Christopher M. Bruner,
Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309 (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1617890.
10 5Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 21(1), 283 (U.K.). The company's constitution includes
the "articles" and various resolutions and agreements. The articles set out "regulations for the
company," but "model articles" apply by default. Id. §§ 17-20. While the articles have been loosely
analogized to U.S. bylaws, the core distinction regarding shareholder power to alter the respective
documents is apparent from the British perspective. See, e.g., SEC, Roundtable Discussions, supra
note 55, at 205 (William Underhill, a partner of the leading U.K. law firm Slaughter and May,
analogizing U.K. articles to U.S. bylaws while observing that changes to the articles require
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corporate power structure.""' Other countries with similar legal systems and
market structures essentially follow the U.K. approach,"' including
Australia'" and Canada." In this light, it should come as no surprise that
comparative corporate scholars consider the bylaw power dynamics
discussed above to be idiosyncratic to U.S. corporate governance. The
Anatomy of Corporate Law, for example, in its comparative analysis of the
corporate laws of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, observes that Delaware bylaws "have a curious status,"
and particularly that an "odd provision" of the Delaware statute (i.e., DGCL
section 109) permits simultaneous shareholder and board competence to
enact, amend, and repeal bylaws, with no guidance on their interaction."
This relative ambivalence regarding the appropriate distribution of
power naturally conditions the response of Delaware judges to cases probing
the outer reaches of the shareholders' bylaw authority. Recall that the
Delaware Supreme Court, in CA, Inc., provides little guidance regarding the
distinction between permissible and impermissible shareholder bylaws. The
procedural-substantive distinction is conceptually useful, to be sure, but
ultimately far short of a principled means of defining the bylaw authority.
As the court itself observes, "the Bylaw's wording, although relevant, is not
dispositive of whether or not it is process-related," which ultimately turns on
the bylaw's "context and purpose.""' Put differently, there is an underlying
criterion against which the bylaw must be evaluated, but the court cannot say
what it is-precisely because what is at stake is the core balance of power in
Delaware corporations, regarding which Delaware remains ambivalent.
Indeed, "ambivalent" would be a good word to describe the court's
doctrinal conclusions in CA, Inc. Ultimately the "context and purpose"-"to
shareholder approval).
1o6ALAN DIGNAM & JOHN LOWRY, COMPANY LAW 7-8 (5th ed. 2009); see also Bruner,
supra note 54, at 604-05.
'See Jennifer G. Hill, The Rising Tension between Shareholder andDirector Power in the
Common Law World 13-15, 26-27 (European Corporate Governance Inst. Law Working Paper no.
152/2010, Apr. 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1582258.
'
0 8See Corporations Act 2001, §§ 9, 136(2), 249D (Austl.); see also R.P. AUSTIN & I.M.
RAMSAY, FORD'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW 202-03 (14th ed. 2010).
109See Canada Business Corporations Act, C.R.C, c. C-44, §§ 2(1), 173, 175-76. Under the
Canadian statute, a special resolution requires a two-thirds vote of shareholders. Id § 2(1). While
the Canadian statute includes separate bylaws that directors possess default authority to enact, this
power can be taken away by the shareholders through unilateral amendment of the articles. Id. §
103(1); see also BRUCE WELLING, CORPORATE LAW IN CANADA: THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
459-61 (3d ed. 2006).
"oEdward Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 183, 188-89 &
n.22 (2d ed. 2009).
'CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 236-37 (Del. 2008).
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promote the integrity of [the] electoral process"-militate toward declaring
the proposed proxy expense reimbursement bylaw a proper subject for
shareholder action, evidently because shareholders have "a legitimate
interest" in the selection of board candidates." 2 However, the criterion
against which we evaluate the legitimacy of shareholder interests-the
critical matter at issue here-is not specified. This most sensitive issue is
effectively obscured by the second part of the court's analysis, in which the
issue is reframed by reference to the board's fiduciary duties. AFSCME's
argument that the board could not be forced to violate fiduciary duties of
which it had been relieved by the shareholders is not really "more semantical
than substantive," as the court suggests."' The problem is that accepting it
would force the court, as a substantive matter, to define the board's
governance power, and effectively the corporation, in highly shareholder-
centric terms-a step the court has long remained unwilling to take.
Just like in the hostile takeover cases, where the core issue of control
over the success of hostile tender offers is refrained as being whether the
board's fiduciary duties permit such a decision to be "delegated to the
stockholders,"ll4 in CA, Inc., the core issue of control over proxy expense
reimbursement is reframed as being whether a bylaw can "relieve the board
entirely of [its fiduciary] duties in this specific area."" Just like Delaware's
takeover jurisprudence, this nascent Delaware bylaw jurisprudence employs
an ambivalent formulation of fiduciary duties as a means of obscuring the
core policy choices at issue, papering over the lack of a definitive theory
regarding the appropriate role of shareholders in corporate governance."'
"2Id. at 237.
"
3 See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
"
4 Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990)
(characterizing the critical authority to set the "time frame for achievement of corporate goals" as a
fiduciary duty matter that "may not be delegated to the stockholders").
"'CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 239; see also Bruner, supra note 71, at 73-74.
"
6See Gordon, supra note 19, at 547 ("The Delaware court needs a theory to explain the
appropriate boundary between shareholder power and the board's authority . . . ."); McDonnell,
supra note 20, at 222 (observing, as of 2005, that "no theory ... perfectly explains the full pattern of
what can and cannot be included in the bylaws"); Thompson, supra note 57, at 784 ("The [CA, Inc.]
court tells us, in effect, that section 141 trumps section 109 but there is little in the opinion in the
way of explicit discussion of what governance function that leaves for shareholder voting, or more
generally, the role for shareholder participation in corporate governance by voting, selling, or
suing."); Thompson & Smith, supra note 21, at 320 ("Most commentators ... have concluded that
the two sections of the Delaware statute [sections 109 and 141] cannot be reconciled without appeal
to policy arguments."); cf William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on
Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CI1. L. REV. 1067, 1070-71 (2002) (observing the Delaware
judiciary's tendency "to write judicial opinions in a way that obscures policy choices," including in
its takeover jurisprudence); Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning ofCorporate
Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 876 (1990) (arguing that, "in the guise of evaluating
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A close examination of the bylaw debate, including the Delaware
Supreme Court's latest and most extensive foray into that debate, reveals that
it implicates a constellation of issues at the heart of corporate governance
itself-what the core division of power between shareholders and boards
ought to be. The court's opinion in CA, Inc. reflects that, much like with
hostile takeovers in the 1980s, Delaware judges have again been placed in
the awkward position of answering the core policy questions of corporate
law itself-something they are loathe to do in a clear and direct manner for
reasons discussed above. At the same time, however, CA, Inc. reflects
another important dimension of corporate lawmaking in the United
States--the complex balance of state and federal power in this area. Recall
that the dispute related to a proposed bylaw, not an enacted one; that it
arrived at the Delaware Supreme Court's door not on appeal from the Court
the propriety of various defensive measures in specific takeover battles, the Delaware judiciary is
deciding the foundational question of corporate purpose").
While one state, North Dakota, has adopted a decidedly shareholder-centric corporate statute
for public companies, it has effectively become the exception that proves the rule of American
ambivalence regarding shareholders. Adopted at the behest of activist investor Carl Icahn (who first
shopped it to Vermont, unsuccessfully), the statute attracted no adherents in its first two years of
existence. As of June 2010, only a single corporation - controlled by Icahn -had reincorporated in
North Dakota to take advantage of the law. See American Railcar Industries, Inc., Form 10-Q for
the quarter ended June 30, 2009, at 7, 42 (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/I 344596/000095012309032254/c8901 IelOvq.htm; Associated Press, Rail car
maker moves corporate home to N.D., BISMARCK TRIB., July 1, 2009, at IB; E-mail from Darcy
Hurley, Administrative Staff Officer, Secretary of State Business Division, State of North Dakota,
(June 7, 2010, 10:43 CST) (on file with author); Carl Icahn, More Rights for Shareholders in North
Dakota, ICAHNREPORT.COM (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.icahnreport.com/report/2008/12/more-
rights-for.html; Elizabeth Lopatto, 'Virgin'North Dakota Draws Billionaire Icahn in Raider Quest,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aXgfseyKwJml; Dale Wetzel, Icahn company setting up corporate residence in ND,
ASSOCIATED PRESS FINANCIAL WIRE (June 11, 2009. 10:06 PM), http://www.allbusiness.com/
government/government-bodies-offices-regional-local/12511376-1.html. The company in question,
American Railcar Industries, Inc., lists among its publicly filed "risk factors" that Icahn's interests
"may conflict with the interest of our other stockholders," and that "[i]nterpretation and application
of [the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act] is scarce and such lack of predictability
could be detrimental to our stockholders." American Railcar Industries, Inc., Form 10-K for the
fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 2009, at 19-20 (Mar. 12, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1344596/000095012310024240/c97389el0vk.htm (accessed June 7, 2010).
Ironically, proxy disclosure to shareholders preceding the vote on reincorporation notes that
"shareholders may not immediately be able to avail themselves of all of the benefits otherwise
available to them under the North Dakota Corporate Law" due to Icahn's control. American Railcar
Industries, Inc., Schedule 14A, at 43 (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/I 344596/000136231009006080/c84436defl4a.htm (accessed June 7, 2009).
Meanwhile, according to Bloomberg, "the publicly traded Icahn Enterprises LP remains incorporated
in Delaware." See Lopatto, supra.
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of Chancery, but rather via the SEC's direct certification; and that the
questions put to the court were framed not by reference to a Delaware legal
dispute, but rather an SEC rule governing inclusion of shareholder proposals
in public company proxy statements, which itself turns (in part) on state
law.117
Fully comprehending the nature of the shareholders' bylaw authority
and its likely future development, then, will clearly require grappling with
the ways in which rules of corporate governance are generated in our federal
legal system--including the complex and evolving mechanisms through
which state and federal lawmakers and regulators interact. In this part of the
Article I evaluate the impact of the SEC's shareholder proposal process on
the shareholder bylaw debate, as well as its interaction with Delaware's new
process for SEC certification of questions of Delaware law directly to the
Delaware Supreme Court. I conclude that the resulting manner in which
such disputes are framed threatens to substantially distort the evaluation and
evolution of the shareholders' bylaw authority-and consequently the
fundamental matters of corporate governance policy that they implicate.
A. Spheres of Corporate Governance Regulation
A typical public company in the United States will find itself regulated
by corporate law made in Delaware and securities regulation made by
Congress and the SEC."' Looking no further than this, we can already
identify three relevant spheres in which corporate governance rules are
generated." Under the "internal affairs doctrine"-the prevailing choice of
law rule for corporate governance matters in the United States-the internal
affairs of corporations are generally subject to the laws of the state of
incorporation.'20 Hence, for most public companies, this means the law of
Delaware. By the same token, it is quite clear that Congress possesses ample
"
7See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
"
8 See Bruner, supra note 104, at 326.
"Note that the typical public company will also be subject to stock exchange listing rules
and market customs predominantly developed in New York. See id. For example, New York Stock
Exchange listing rules require shareholder votes in a broader range of circumstances than Delaware
law does, including certain transactions involving the issuance of common stock equaling 20 percent
of pre-transaction outstanding shares or voting power, and transactions involving a "change of
control." NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 312.03(c)-(d), http:// nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/.
'
20See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302,304 (1971); CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) ("No principle of corporation law and practice is
more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the
authority to define the voting rights of shareholders."); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462,479 (1977).
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authority under the Commerce Clause to federalize substantial swathes of the
corporate governance terrain, 121 as it has frequently done in times of crisis.
Notable examples include passage of the core federal securities laws in the
1930s (i.e., the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934) following the stock market crash and onset of the Great Depression;
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 following accounting scandals at Enron,
WorldCom, and other companies; and most recently the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act following the subprime
mortgage crisis and ensuing economic downturn. 2 2 However, as courts and
commentators have repeatedly observed, federal securities law quite clearly
has not preempted the field,' leading many to speak of a rough division of
labor in which states predominantly regulate internal corporate affairs while
the federal government predominantly regulates external capital markets.'
The upshot of this state of affairs is an uneasy balance of state and
federal competence in the regulation of corporate governance. While the
degree to which Delaware faces competition from other states desiring to
attract incorporations has been a topic of academic discussion for decades, it
is increasingly clear that Delaware's true competition lies not among the
other states, but in Washington, DC. Robert Daines, in a study of 6,671
initial public offerings between 1978 and 2000, found that 95 percent of
firms incorporating outside their headquarters state incorporated in
Delaware, and that "no state besides Delaware has had any meaningful
success in attracting out-of-state firms going public.""' Lucian Bebchuk and
Assaf Hamdani similarly found (in 2002) that 85 percent of public
companies incorporated outside their headquarters state were incorporated in
121See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
122See Bruner, supra note 104, at 332-35; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic
Federalism and the Structure ofCorporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1574-90 (2005); Mark J.
Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6-12 (2009);
Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REV. 588, 591-92 (2003); Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on a
Responsible Path Forward, 63 BuS. LAW. 1079, 1084-85 (2008); E. Norman Veasey, What Would
Madison Think? The Irony of the Twists and Turns of Federalism, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 39-42
(2009).
S23see, e.g., CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89; Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 479 ("Absent a clear
indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of
corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of
corporate regulation would be overridden."); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 504-05
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Veasey, supra note 122, at 41-42.
124See, e.g., Veasey, supra note 122, at 43.
125Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices oflPOFirms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559,1570-
74(2002).
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Delaware.' "Other than Delaware," Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar argue,
"no state structures its taxes to gain from incorporations or stands to reap
substantial benefits from legal business by attracting incorporations.""'
Delaware cannot, however, afford to ignore the threat that Congress poses to
its preeminent position in the creation of corporate governance rules. As
Mark Roe has observed, "Delaware players have reason to fear that if they
misstep, they will lose their lawmaking business"-that federal players,
"even if not breathing down their necks at every moment, could act if they so
chose."'28
Much of the federal government's involvement in corporate
governance takes shape in the years following congressional action, through
agency rulemaking-notably at the SEC. Created by Congress through the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (often called the Exchange Act), the SEC
is an independent agency charged with implementation of various federal
securities statutes."' This inserts the SEC directly into the middle of
substantial corporate governance matters due, among other things, to
Exchange Act Section 14(a), which gives the agency broad authority to enact
rules regulating the solicitation of proxies by public companies e critical
mechanism for voting in large companies with widely dispersed
shareholders.M This authority naturally brings us back to the issue of the
shareholders' bylaw authority under state law which, as a practical matter,
can be operationalized in a typical public company only by aggregating
proxies in favor of the proposal from a large number of minority
shareholders costly endeavor indeed."' It was "[i]n response to the high
126Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 37, at 578.
127Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REv. 679, 687 (2002); see also Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and
Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 843-47 (1995) (arguing that "network externalities"
associated with Delaware chartering have effectively locked in Delaware's dominant position);
Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for
Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 214 (2006) (arguing that other states do compete
with Delaware, though acknowledging that this principally takes the form of "defensive"
competition to keep locally headquartered corporations incorporated in their home state).
'
28Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 122, at 601; see also Edward Rock & Marcel
Kahan, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the
Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 715 (2009).
129See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006); Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 67-68 (5th ed. 2004).
'"sSee 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 185-86; SEC, Roundtable
Discussions, supra note 55, at 6 (former Chairman Christopher Cox acknowledging that proxy
rulemaking "involves fundamental questions of what shareholders get to do and how they get to do
it"). Note that the creation of proxies (as opposed to their solicitation) remains a matter of state law.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(c).
13'The default requirement for shareholder action (aside from board elections and certain
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cost of shareholder voting" that the SEC promulgated Rule 14a-8,'32 which
-- in its own words-"addresses when a company must include a
shareholder's proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its
form of proxy.""'
B. Rule 14a-8 and State Corporate Law
A shareholder seeking inclusion of a proposal in the corporation's
proxy statement-effectively meaning that the cost of making the proposal
will be shifted to the company 3 4-- must meet various threshold eligibility
requirements; follow a specified procedure; and avoid falling within
enumerated substantive categories that Rule 14a-8 permits the company to
exclude. To be eligible, the shareholder must have held securities worth
$2,000 in market value, or 1 percent, of the company's securities entitled to
vote for at least one year as of the date of the proposal, and continue to hold
them through the meeting."' The shareholder may make only one proposal
per meeting, which (together with its supporting statement) cannot exceed
500 words.' Rule 14a-8 further specifies the deadline by which proposals
must be submitted, and generally requires that the proposing shareholder or
"a qualified representative" attend the meeting.'37 The rule then specifies
various substantive bases on which the company may seek to exclude the
proposal, the first two of which gave rise to the questions put to the
Delaware Supreme Court in CA, Inc.-" [i]f the proposal is not a proper
subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the
company's organization," and "[i]f the proposal would, if implemented,
cause the company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is
subject.""'
The corporation may not, however, simply exclude the proposal at its
own discretion. Rule 14a-8 requires that a company seeking to exclude a
fundamental actions) is "the affirmative vote of the majority of shares present in person or
represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject matter." DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 216(2).
'
32STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS
718-19 (2d ed. 2008). The SEC's proxy rules appear in Regulation 14A, consisting of a series of
rules that collectively regulate the process for soliciting proxies from public company shareholders,
including disclosures required in connection with such solicitation efforts. See 17 C.F.R. §§
240.14a-1 to -20 (2010).
.. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010) (emphasis added).
134See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 222; CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 132, at 718-19.
3s17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1).
"
61d. § 240.14a-8(c)-(d).
37Id. § 240.14a-8(e), (h).
38Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1)-(2).
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proposal "must file its reasons" with the SEC-including "[a]n explanation
of why the company believes that it may exclude the proposal, which should,
if possible, refer to the most recent applicable authority, such as prior
Division letters issued under the rule" (so-called "no-action letters,"
discussed below), as well as a "supporting opinion of counsel when such
reasons are based on matters of state or foreign law."'"3 Shareholders are
urged to respond to such arguments,'" but are assured that in general "the
burden is on the company to demonstrate that it is entitled to exclude a
proposal" - meaning that a tie should break in favor of the shareholder
proponent.''
This cursory overview of the structure of Rule 14a-8 is sufficient to
expose the federal systemic tensions posed by the shareholder bylaw
authority in large public companies. Congress' intent in enacting Exchange
Act Section 14(a)--of which Rule 14a-8 naturally can be but an
expression-was "to require fair opportunity for the operation of corporate
suffrage."'42 As the Third Circuit put it, in SEC v. Transamerica Corp.,
"control of great corporations by a very few persons was the abuse at which
Congress struck in enacting Section 14(a)."l 43 In this light, the potential for
conflict between Rule 14a-8 and Delaware corporate law arises in two
senses. First, "corporate suffrage," as noted above, is quintessential
corporate governance, a matter historically left to the states.'" Second, the
board's authority to manage the "business and affairs" of the corporation
under DGCL section 141(a).-which CA, Inc. describes as "a cardinal
precept" of Delaware corporate lawl4 5-clearly militates to some degree (for
better or worse) toward "control of great corporations by a very few
persons."
Such tensions were quite vividly illustrated in the SEC's August 2010
proxy access rulemaking. Should the SEC overcome Business Roundtable's
suit challenging its legality,'" the new Rule 14a-1 1 would permit (in certain
circumstances) shareholders or groups holding 3 percent voting power for
three years to include in the company's proxy their own nominees for up to
'"
91d. § 240.14a-8(j).
'"17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(k).
'
4 1Id. § 240.14a-8(g).
142SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947).
1431d
'"See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
'4CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 n.7 (Del. 2008).
'"On October 4, 2010, the SEC stayed implementation of the new proxy access regime
pending resolution of a suit filed by Business Roundtable challenging its legality. See Securities and
Exchange Commission, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 64641 (Oct.
20, 2010); Jessica Holzer, SEC Awaits Court Ruling on Proxy Rule, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2010.
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25 percent of the board (or at least one seat). 1 The SEC's amendment of
Rule 14a-8 would also facilitate shareholder proposals to establish
nomination procedures in the company's governing documents. 148 Critically,
the proxy access rule would effectively be mandatory, permitting states or
companies to opt out only through the extreme step of prohibiting
shareholder nominations entirely.149 Though styled in the adopting release as
merely "facilitat[ing] the effective exercise of shareholders' traditional State
law rights to nominate and elect directors,"'s dissenting Commissioners
characterized the mandatory proxy access rule as "confer[ring] upon
shareholders a new substantive federal right that in many respects runs
counter to what state corporate law otherwise provides,""' and the adopting
release itself as "a jiu-jitsu exercise of purporting to give deference to state
law ... when in fact the rules do exactly the opposite." 5 2
The SEC, recognizing the inevitability of such tensions in the area of
proxy regulation, has sought to manage them in the context of shareholder
proposals principally by crafting Rule 14a-8 exclusions turning on the
permissibility of a given proposal under state law."' As noted above, these
provisions permit the company to exclude proposals that are not proper
subjects for shareholder action under state law and proposals that, if enacted,
would otherwise cause the company to violate state law.'54
14 7See generally Securities and Exchange Commission, Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010) [hereinafter SEC, Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations]; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11.
148See SEC, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 147, at 56730-34;
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-8(i)(8).
14 9See SEC, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 147, at 56678; see
also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 1(a)(2). The creation of a proxy access regime followed an express
invitation by Congress to do so. See SEC, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra
note 147, at 56674 (observing that "Congress confirmed our authority in this area and removed any
doubt that we have authority to adopt a rule such as Rule 14a- I1" in § 971 of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)).
'soSEC, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 147, at 56668.
'
5
'Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement at
Open Meeting to Adopt the Final Rule Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations
("Proxy Access") (Aug. 25, 2010), http://sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510tap.htm.
152Kathleen L. Casey, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement at
Open Meeting to Adopt the Final Rule Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510klc.htm; see also Proxy Access
Frum: ChristopherBnmer, CONGLOMERATEBIDG(Aug. 26, 2010http /wwthecmw ea/forum-
proxy-access/.
53See McDonnell, supra note 20, at 254 (describing the proper subject exclusion as "part of
the intricate balancing of state and federal law that goes on in this area").
15417 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1)-(2).
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C. The SEC's Response to Delaware's Ambivalence
Given the degree of state-federal tension involved, and the core
questions of shareholder power implicated, it is unsurprising that the proper
subject exclusion has been the "most recurrent question" in this area.'" This
exclusion, taken at face value, would appear to leave the appropriate balance
of power between boards and shareholders entirely to state law, but that does
not mean that the SEC has no impact here. Recall that companies may not
simply exclude proposals at their own discretion. Rule 14a-8 establishes a
specific process that a company seeking to exclude a shareholder proposal
must follow, involving a submission to the SEC detailing "why the company
believes that it may exclude the proposal," citing "the most recent applicable
authority, such as prior Division letters issued under the rule," and including
a "supporting opinion of counsel when such reasons are based on matters of
state or foreign law""'--the burden being on the company to demonstrate
entitlement to the exclusion.'" As Louis Loss and Joel Seligman explain,
[W]ith the Commission in the position in which the federal
courts frequently find themselves under the Erie doctrine of
guessing what the state courts would say, there is inevitably
much room for the exercise of administrative discretion-and
for resort to the "burden of proof' and "benefit of the doubt"
techniques in deciding individual cases.'"
Such circumstances, in fact, arise quite often, rendering the SEC's
process for evaluating shareholder proposals highly consequential. The
SEC's Division of Corporation Finance reportedly receives between 300 and
450 requests to exclude shareholder proposals each year,'" and of the 373
addressed between October 2007 and October 2008, approximately 9
percent involved state law issues.' When Rule 14a-8 directs companies
seeking to exclude a proposal to cite "the most recent applicable authority,
'"sLOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 129, at 553.
15617 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j).
..sId. § 240.14a-8(g).
'"LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 129, at 556.
'"John W. White, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Speech to the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar
Association Section of Business Law (Aug. 11, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech /2008/spchO81lO8jww.htm).
'"Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: Certification of State-Law
Questions by Federal Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181, 203 (2010).
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such as prior Division letters issued under the rule,"' it refers to prior "no-
action" letters."' No-action letters are in fact what companies are requesting,
as a technical matter, when they write to the SEC seeking to persuade it that
a proposal should be deemed excludable. No-action letters reflect not the
formal position of the Commission, as such, but the informal position of the
SEC staff regarding whether it would recommend enforcement action to the
Commission if the party in question were to proceed in the manner described
in its request letter. Hence when the SEC provides the requested assurance,
it is said to have provided "no-action" assurance."' According to an SEC
regulation, "[w]hile opinions expressed by members of the staff do not
constitute an official expression of the Commission's views, they represent
the views of persons who are continuously working with the provisions of
the statute involved."'" Though an informal statement with no binding
effect on the SEC (or on a court for that matter), such assurances are
nevertheless viewed by market actors as providing "a high degree of
confidence that they can proceed as planned without any SEC
interference."' In fact, no-action letters are widely viewed as "de facto
adjudication," given that the staff only rarely takes a matter to the full
Commission, and parties involved in the no-action process only rarely
challenge the staffs position.'"
While the SEC claims to "have no interest in the merits of a particular
proposal,"' 7 it is quite common for the SEC to request an opinion of counsel
when not provided with the initial request, and one practitioner observes that
"[a]ny qualifications or waffling in the opinion of counsel ... are usually
met with resistance by the Staff.""' Likewise the staff has expressed
"1617 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j).
162Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 14 (July 13, 2001), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legaV cfslbl4.htm [hereinafter SEC,
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14] ("explain[ing] the rule 14a-8 no-action process").
163See generally Alan J. Berkeley, Obtaining StaffGuidance Today, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES LAW (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, June 2008) (LEXIS, Course Number
SN018); see also BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 22, § 24:70.10; SEC, Staff Legal Bulletin
No. 14, supra note 162, §§ B.3-B.5; White, supra note 159.
'"17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d). The regulation adds that "any statement by the director, associate
director, assistant director, chief accountant, chief counsel, or chief financial analyst of a division
can be relied upon as representing the views of that division." Id.
'
65Berkeley, supra note 163, at "What Staff Relief Means."
'"See BLOOMENTHAL& WOLFF,supra note 22, § 24:70.10; see also 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d)
(indicating that the staff generally puts questions to the Commission only when they "involve matters
of substantial importance and where the issues are novel or highly complex"); McDonnell, supra
note 20, at 255.
Ib7SEC, Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, supra note 162, § B.7.
168Berkeley, supra note 163, at "Legal Opinions."
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impatience with "kitchen sink" arguments for exclusion, urging companies
not to "throw in extras that don't provide a solid basis for exclusion."'. In
evaluating opinions of counsel, the staff has indicated that it focuses
particularly on "whether the law underlying the opinion of counsel is
unsettled or unresolved," and reiterates Rule 14a-8's invitation for
shareholders "to contest a company's reliance on an opinion of counsel as to
matters of state or foreign law" with their own competing opinion of
counsel.' This, of course, gestures toward the company's burden to
persuade the SEC that it is entitled to exclude the proposal. As then-Deputy
Director of Corporation Finance Martin Dunn explained at a May 2007
roundtable on the federal proxy rules, a tie on contested matters of state law
should clearly break in favor of a shareholder proposing to amend the bylaws
to constrain board power:
Every time we get a binding [proposal], we get competing state
law opinions, one of which says from the company that 141
doesn't allow this, and then we get one that says 109 does allow
this. We sit there and go we don't know. We are going to say
you haven't met your burden of proof because we have
competing opinions."'
Put this way, it would seem that the federal dimension of the bylaw issue
should be quite straightforward-the consequence of legal indecision in
Delaware is that proposed shareholder bylaw amendments make it into the
proxy.
Yet, the staff positions actually taken on proposed bylaw amendments
in hot-button areas over the last couple decades have been far less consistent
than this statement would tend to suggest. When the Division of
Corporation Finance receives a state law-based request to exclude a
shareholder proposal to amend the bylaws, it effectively has three
options-it can provide the requested no-action assurance (i.e. permitting
exclusion); it can refuse to provide no-action assurance (i.e. rejecting the
claimed basis for exclusion); or it can respond that "the staff is unwilling to
take a position on whether the proposal is excludable or not."' Since the
'
69White, supra note 159.
70Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 14B (Sept. 15, 2004), § E, http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslbl4b.btm; see also
SEC, Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, supra note 162, § G.5.
"'SEC, Roundtable Discussions, supra note 55, at 32; see also BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF,
supra note 22, § 24:84.11.
172McDonnell, supra note 20, at 254.
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early 1990s, as Brett McDonnell observes, the staff "changed tack at several
points" with no "clear pattern," at times permitting inclusion in the proxy of
governance-related bylaws, at times permitting their exclusion, and by 1999,
"declaring in many letters that it will not express any view with respect to
this ground of exclusion where there is no compelling state law precedent."'"
This position appears to have had the practical effect of leading many
companies to exclude such proposals, evidently gambling that the SEC
would be unlikely to pursue a matter in which the core legal principles
remain so murky, and which in any event fall under state rather than federal
law. 174
Harold Bloomenthal and Samuel Wolff, in an analysis of SEC
responses to such no-action requests, identify "the staffs ambivalence with
respect to the shareholders right to propose amendments to a corporation's
bylaws under the Delaware law," exhaustively cataloguing the SEC staffs
flip-flopping on the excludability of various types of proposed bylaw
amendments.1" For example, as of the 1999 proxy season, the staff refused
to express a view on whether proposed bylaws limiting the ability of boards
to adopt poison pills could be excluded as improper under state law, yet by
the 2000 proxy season, the staff appeared to have concluded that such
proposals could be excluded on this basis."'
Analysis of the staffs position is inevitably hampered by the fact that
it "characteristically doesn't articulate the basis for its conclusion" in
responding to no-action requests,'7 7 though it must also be acknowledged that
bylaw proposals themselves in any given area have continually morphed
over the last decade. Since 2002, shareholder proposals aimed at reining in
the use of poison pills have increasingly been phrased in "precatory"
fornm-hat is, in the form of requests or recommendations to the board,
rather than mandates.' This development responds to a "note" included by
the SEC in Rule 14a-8 indicating that "most proposals that are cast as
recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action
are proper under state law" (a debatable legal proposition).1' Additionally,
17 1d. at 254-55.
174See id. at 255-56.
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 22, § 24:71.10.
'6See id. § 24:84.
17Id. § 24:71.20; see also Robert B. Ahdieh, The Dialectical Regulation ofRule 14a-8:
Intersystemic Governance in Corporate Law, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 165, 173 (2007).
'"See BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 22, § 24:84.10.
17917 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1), Note to paragraph (i)(1). There is certainly state case law
endorsing precatory proposals. See, e.g., Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 592-93 (N.Y. 1954).
Their legality in Delaware, however, is less clear. See, e.g., Abdieh, supra note 177, at 173; Strine,
supra note 122, at 1088-89; Veasey, supra note 122, at 53.
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shareholder advocates have continually tried new and creative approaches to
limiting board power, one notable example being Lucian Bebchuk's 2006
bylaw proposal at CA, Inc.-a binding proposal, yet which focused
principally on the manner in which the board itself could approve or extend
a poison pill.o In that instance, the SEC staff expressed "no view with
respect to CA's intention to omit the [proposal] from the proxy materials"
because Bebchuk preemptively sought declaratory relief (unsuccessfully, as
it turned out) in the Delaware Court of Chancery.'"' By 2007, as the
explanation offered by Martin Dunn quoted above tends to suggest, the SEC
seems to have thrown up its hands, purporting to fall back on the
straightforward consequence of the burden of persuasion established in Rule
14a-8 itself-uncertainty in the underlying state law breaks in favor of the
shareholders."
D. Delaware's Certification Process
This confluence of state and federal regulation of proxy voting in
public companies places the SEC in the deeply awkward position of
evaluating the propriety of permitting proposed shareholder bylaw
amendments into the company's proxy while somehow avoiding evaluation
of their legality under state law. In an effort to achieve greater
coherence-both systemic and substantive-in the evaluation of shareholder
proposals, the Delaware Constitution was amended on May 3, 2007 to
permit the SEC to certify questions of Delaware law directly to the Delaware
Supreme Court.'
Given the endemic problems they have raised, it is unsurprising that
the first use of this new certification process was to determine the legality of
a proposed shareholder bylaw phrased in mandatory forn-the proxy
reimbursement bylaw at issue in CA, Inc.'" Presumably reflecting the staffs
checkered history in grappling with such proposals, and the frustration
reflected in Martin Dunn's characterization of the situation by 2007, the
SEC's certification to the Delaware Supreme Court on June 27, 2008,
'
80Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 738 (Del. Ch. 2006).
'
81 d. at 738-39, 745; see also BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 22, § 24:84.20. For
additional discussion of this decision, see infra notes 205-209 and accompanying text.
182For additional background on the SEC's evolving position on the excludability of various
types of corporate governance proposals by shareholders, see BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note
22, §§ 24:71.10-.26, 24:84-24:84.30.
...See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 n.1 (Del. 2008);
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 22, § 24:71.24.
"CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 229 n.1; WELCH ET AL., supra note 9, § 109.5.1.
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observed three times (in a four-page letter) that, unless the court instructs
otherwise, the company would be unable to exclude the proposal for failure
to meet its burden of persuasion.' "The Division [of Corporation Finance],
faced with two conflicting opinions on Delaware law from Delaware law
firms, does not resolve disputed questions of Delaware law," the letter
explains."' "If there is no way to obtain any such resolution, the Division
intends to inform CA that it has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating that
it may exclude the AFSCME Proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(1) or Rule 14a-
8(i)(2)"--that is, the exclusions for matters not proper subjects for
shareholder action under state law, and proposals that, if adopted, would
otherwise cause the company to violate state law.'"
SEC staff openly welcomed the advent of Delaware's new certification
process. Then-Director of the Division of Corporation Finance John White
stated in an August 2008 speech that "this is a very useful tool to have
available to the Corp Fin staff as we review the hundreds of no-action
requests we receive each year on shareholder proposals."'8 8 He specifically
cited the SEC's first certification to the Delaware Supreme Court on June 27,
noting that by July 17 the court had answered the certified questions,
resulting in exclusion of the proposal from CA, Inc.'s proxy.'" "This was
obviously an important decision substantively," he said, but added that "it
also was very important to us in terms of process .... We're very excited to
have this tool at our disposal, and look forward to using it further, as
appropriate, in coming years."." Practitioners likewise heralded the
efficiency of the process, observing that at the time of its creation "it was
unclear exactly how the certification would work, how long a response
would take, and whether the SEC would utilize this process. This case
shows that the SEC will indeed utilize the certification process and that the
process itself can be accomplished fairly quickly," just three weeks having
elapsed between submission of the certification letter and rendering of the
court's opinion in CA, Inc.'9 1
Academic commentary has gone further. McDonnell characterizes
'
85See Securities and Exchange Commission, Certification of Questions of Law Arising
from Rule 14a-8 Proposal by Shareholder of CA, Inc., at 2-4 (June 27, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/cal4a8cert.pdf [hereinafter SEC, Certification of Questions].
'"Id. at 2.
8Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1)-(2).
'
88White, supra note 159.
1sold.
19'Wilensky & Priest, supra note 77, § LB n. 22; cf BLOOMENTHAL& WOLFF, supra note
22, § 24:84.11 (suggesting that the Delaware certification process "could provide an answer to Mr.
Dunn's quandary").
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SEC certification to the Delaware Supreme Court as "an important new
procedure that increases the chances for useful dialogue."'92 Robert Ahdieh
similarly suggests that it permits "more meaningful opportunity for
dialectical engagement" between state and federal governmental actors,
providing a model for "a broader pattern of [SEC] engagement with relevant
state authorities."" Verity Winship likewise argues that "states should
consider following and expanding on Delaware's lead to institute federal
agency certification," said to be "a flexible mechanism with the potential to
promote cooperative interbranch federalism."'94
E. The Distortion of Bylaw Disputes
It is undoubtedly true that the SEC is poorly positioned to guess how
state courts-including those of Delaware-would handle a given dispute.
As Winship observes, the "flip side" of Chevron deference to federal agency
statutory interpretation is that such agencies "are not expected to be expert
beyond the limits of the statute or subject area they administer."' In this
light, the SEC's expression of humility in flatly refusing to wade into
"disputed questions of Delaware law""' is entirely appropriate. The question
remains, however, whether the structure the SEC and Delaware have struck
upon-certification by this federal agency of open questions of law to the
Delaware Supreme Court-is in fact the optimal solution, given the
predominant manner in which such questions arise in the federal securities
regime.
Ahdieh emphasizes that addressing bylaws at the proposal stage
avoids expense and effort associated with pursuing adoption of the bylaw
and then litigating its validity in state court, while effectively supplanting a
flawed "status quo, in which one-paragraph no-action letters are the final
arbiter of proxy proposals."' This is undoubtedly correct, but CA, Inc. itself
nevertheless suggests that the costs of the certification approach in actual
practice will likely outweigh any such benefits. First and foremost, the fact
that bylaw disputes come before the SEC (or its staff, rather) at the proposal
stage means that matters certified by the SEC will arrive at the Delaware
Supreme Court framed in ex ante, hypothetical terms, rather than ex post,
'
92McDonnell, supra note 38, at 38.
A93 hdieh, supra note 177, at 175-76, 179.
'9Winship, supra note 160, at 234.
'"Id. at 212.
'
96SEC, Certification of Questions, supra note 185, at 2; see also supra notes 167-171 and
accompanying text.
19 7Ahdieh, supra note 177, at 175-76.
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factually specific terms. This point certainly was not lost on the Delaware
Supreme Court in CA, Inc.:
Were this issue being presented in the course of litigation
involving the application of the Bylaw to a specific set of facts,
we would start with the presumption that the Bylaw is valid
and, if possible, construe it in a manner consistent with the law.
The factual context in which the Bylaw was challenged would
inform our analysis, and we would "exercise caution [before]
invalidating corporate acts based upon hypothetical injuries...
The certified questions, however, request a determination of
the validity of the Bylaw in the abstract. Therefore, in response
to the second question [i.e. whether the bylaw, if adopted,
would require the company to violate Delaware law], we must
necessarily consider any possible circumstance under which a
board of directors might be required to act.'"
Having framed the matter in this way-a direct consequence of its
arrival via SEC certification rather than through Delaware litigation-the
bylaw was ultimately found to be contrary to Delaware law because "[u]nder
at least one such hypothetical, the board of directors would breach their
fiduciary duties if they complied with the Bylaw."'9 9
There are compelling reasons not to approach the issue of shareholder
bylaws in this way. For ease of reference, the core distinctions between
treatment of a bylaw arising organically through Delaware litigation, on the
one hand, and through the SEC certification process, on the other, are
summarized below in Figure 1. As the Delaware Supreme Court explained
in Stroud v. Grace, the argument that "hypothetical injuries" should
invalidate bylaws proves too much-because the practical reality is that
"every valid by-law is always susceptible to potential misuse."200
Consequently, it is not an overstatement to suggest that literally any bylaw
arriving at the court's door via SEC certification is vulnerable to preemptive
invalidation based on identification of a single hypothetical abuse.
McDonnell fairly questions whether the fact that the bylaw was not yet
enacted really necessitated so demanding a validity test, suggesting that
198CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008) (citing Stroud
v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 79 (Del. 1992)) (footnotes omitted).
'"Id.
2
"Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 79, 96 (Del. 1992) (emphasis added); see also WELCH ET
AL., supra note 9, § 109.9.
2011] 39
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
perhaps the court might have employed something akin to the test for a
statute's facial constitutionality-an approach under which the bylaw's
"overbreadth ... must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," before the court would
conclude that enacting it would require violation of Delaware law.2"' It is not
clear, however, that application of such a standard would have made a
difference in CA, Inc. To be sure, McDonnell's test would require of the
board something more than identification of a single hypothetical problem.
Yet the court specifically emphasizes that it "is not far fetched" that the
board's fiduciary duties might require that proxy expense reimbursement be
denied entirely, an analysis turning heavily on the board's own perception of
the company's best interests.202 Given the court's rejection of AFSCME's
claim that shareholders could relieve the board of its duties in this
area 20 3-and the consequent framing of the issue through traditional fiduciary
duty analysis strongly protective of board discretion-we could readily
imagine CA, Inc. arguing that AFSCME's mandatory reimbursement bylaw
was substantially overbroad, and the court accepting that characterization."*
In any event, such an alternative approach to evaluating a proposed bylaw's
validity would not eliminate the core problem---the fact that SEC
certification of proposed bylaws unavoidably requires this form of
speculation regarding the hypothetical use of an as-yet hypothetical bylaw.
The dangers posed more generally by such evaluation of hypotheticals
motivate the long-standing common law commitment to the ripeness
doctrine, as Vice Chancellor Lamb discusses in his Bebchuk v. CA, Inc.
opinion. Recall that Bebchuk sought a declaration from the Delaware court
regarding the validity of a proposed bylaw limiting the manner in which the
board could approve or extend a poison pill.205 In refusing to provide
declaratory relief, Vice Chancellor Lamb observed that "Delaware courts
have announced justiciability rules that closely resemble those followed at
the federal level."2" Specifically, "Delaware courts do not rule on cases
unless they are 'ripe for judicial determination,' consistent with a well
20
'McDonnell, supra note 38, at 41-42 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973)).
202CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240.
203 d.
2
"McDonnell quite reasonably questions whether "there's really a broad range of
circumstances in which a board's duty would recuire it to not compensate successful shareholder
nominees," but agrees that given the approach taken in CA, Inc., SEC certification to the Delaware
Supreme Court appears problematic. See McDonnell, supra note 38, at 42.
2osBebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 738-39 (Del. Ch. 2006).
206Id. at 740.
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established reluctance to issue advisory or hypothetical opinions."207 The
reason, Vice Chancellor Lamb explains (quoting the Delaware Supreme
Court), is that "[w]henever a court examines a matter where facts are not
fully developed, it runs the risk not only of granting an incorrect judgment,
but also of taking an inappropriate or premature step in the development of
the law"--a risk that is all that much greater in areas raising "novel and
important [issues] to Delaware corporate law," including the scope of the
shareholder bylaw authority.208 In refusing to provide declaratory relief,
Lamb rightly observes that this area is "fraught with tension," and that, "just
as in Stroud and its progeny, the factual context . . .could be of the utmost
importance."2 ' Indeed, as Vice Chancellor Strine (facing a similar matter)
explained several years earlier in General Datacomm Industries, "[a]bsent an
imminent threat of irreparable injury, there seems to be no need and much
risk for this court to step into the void when the SEC concludes that state law
is not clear enough ... to exclude a proposal."210 He rightly adds that this
very SEC determination-practically by hypothesis-renders the matter
"precisely the sort about which this court should be reluctant to opine until
the issue is ripe for judicial resolution."" "
Figure 1: Treatment of Shareholder Bylaw Disputes
in Delaware Litigation and the SEC Certification Process
litigation Certification
status of bylaw enacted proposed
factual posture ex post/ ex ante/
concrete hypothetical
presumed valid yes no
parity with yes no
board bylaws
207Id. (quoting Stroud v. Milliken Enters. Inc., 552 A.2d 476, 479-80 (Del. 1989)).
20sBebchuk, 902 A.2d at 740-41 (quoting Stroud, 552 A.2d at 480).
209Bebchuk, 902 A.2d at 742. Ultimately the matter never became ripe, the bylaw in
question receiving 41 percent of the vote at the subsequent annual meeting. See supra note 94 and
accompanying text.
21oSee Gen. Datacomm Indus., Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 822 (Del
Ch. 1999).
211 d
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Another consequence of this mode of analysis that should be of
particular concern to the SEC itself is that shareholders are placed in a far
less favorable position than they would occupy had the matter arisen through
Delaware litigation. The Delaware Supreme Court explained, in Frantz
Manufacturing Co. v. EA C Indus., that, given their status as "an inherent
feature of the corporate structure," enacted bylaws are "presumed to'be valid,
and the courts will construe the bylaws in a manner consistent with the law
rather than strike down the bylaws."212 As the court observed in CA, Inc.,
however, this presumption of validity is lost in the SEC certification scenario
because the nature of the inquiry requires "determination of the validity of
the Bylaw in the abstract.""' Should Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 and the new
certification process become the principal lens through which shareholder
bylaws are examined in Delaware, the consequence would presumably be a
double standard-board (and controller) bylaws getting the benefit of a
powerful presumption in their favor,2 14 and minority shareholder bylaws
being preemptively struck down based on hypothetical abuses. Recalling the
Stroud court's observation that "every valid by-law is always susceptible to
potential misuse,"21 the new certification process taken to its logical extreme
could result in de facto elimination of the shareholders' statutory authority to
enact, amend, and repeal bylaws in public companies.
IV. DECIDING WHO DECIDES
In light of the fundamental issues of corporate law implicated by
shareholder bylaws; the uneasy balance of state and federal regulatory
competence in the area of corporate governance; and the peculiar dynamics
created by the interaction of Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 with the new process
for certifying questions directly to the Delaware Supreme Court, it is
enormously important that more concerted effort be devoted to thinking
through how the balance between board and shareholder power ought to be
struck, and more immediately, who ought to decide what the scope of
permissible shareholder bylaws ought to be. In this part of the Article I
consider how we ought to decide who decides.
I argue below that there is no perfect approach to the shareholder
2 Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985).
213CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008); see also
WELCH ET AL., supra note 9, § 109.4.
214See, e.g., Frantz Mfg. Co., 501 A.2d at 407; Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 96 (Del.
1992); Orloff v. Shulman, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 184, at *49-*50 (Del. Ch. 2005); Underbrink v.
Warrior Energy Servs. Corp., No. 2982-VCP, 2008 WL 2262316, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008).
"'Stroud, 606 A.2d at 96 (Del. 1992) (emphasis added).
42 [Vol. 36
MANAGING CORPORATE FEDERALISM
bylaw debate because in our system of corporate federalism--whatever its
strengths may be-there is no single governmental actor possessing both the
requisite political legitimacy and epistemic legitimacy216 to address the
fundamental issues of corporate power and purpose in a compelling, broadly
acceptable manner. The least-bad solution, however, would remove the SEC
from the equation to the greatest degree practicable, leaving the matter in the
first instance to Delaware, subject to the omnipresent threat of episodic
legislative intervention by Congress. This could be achieved at lowest cost
by a strict SEC policy of denying requests for exclusion of Rule 14a-8
proposals prompting competing Delaware legal opinions, thereby
minimizing reliance on certification to the Delaware Supreme Court and
facilitating the organic development of Delaware's case law in this area.
A. Federalism and Regulatory Legitimacy in Corporate Governance
As discussed above, there are effectively three relevant spheres in
which corporate governance rules are generated-Delaware, Congress, and
the SEC.' Setting aside the internal affairs doctrine, the SEC plainly
possesses little political or epistemic legitimacy to delineate the parameters
of bylaw authority under state corporate law (see Figure 2 below). Like the
takeover debate before it, the debate over the appropriate scope of the
shareholders' bylaw authority necessarily implicates the core questions of
power and purpose that define the field, in turn impacting not only the board
and the shareholders, but other constituencies as well, notably employees.218
The SEC's "lack of expertise in state law""'-out of which this debate arises
- is clear. Perhaps more significantly, however, it must be borne in mind
that the SEC is effectively a single-constituency regulator. Congress'
principal intent in enacting the securities laws was investor protection
(primarily through mandatory disclosure coupled with anti-fraud rules)-a
goal not lost on the SEC, which accurately describes its "mission" as being
2161 have employed the distinction elsewhere. See Christopher M. Bruner, States, Markets,
and Gatekeepers: Public-Private Regulatory Regimes in an Era of Economic Globalization, 30
MICH. J. INT'L L. 125, 125-30 (2008). In using the term "epistemic legitimacy" I refer generally to
normative authority derived from recognized "expert" knowledge-effectively a form of reputational
accountability. By "political legitimacy" I refer generally to democratic accountability. See id. at
129-33.
217See supra notes 118-133 and accompanying text. While one might further distinguish the
perspectives and relative competencies of the Delaware General Assembly and the Delaware courts,
the three-part distinction drawn in this Article suffices for a discussion of the general dynamics of
American corporate federalism.
218See supra notes 51-116 and accompanying text.
219Ahdieh, supra note 177, at 172.
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"to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and
facilitate capital formation."220 Practically by hypothesis, such an agency is
poorly positioned to address in a coherent fashion the degree of power
shareholders ought to possess, or the degree to which corporate law ought to
emphasize their interests over those of other constituencies-fundamental,
policy-driven issues throwing into question the SEC's axiomatic premise.
The SEC aptly styles itself "the investor's advocate,""' and in so doing it
calls into question its competence to consider even-handedly these types of
inherently multi-constituency issues.222 Given the SEC's (ineffective) efforts
to evade these types of matters through state law-based exclusions in Rule
14a-8, the Commission itself presumably would not disagree with this
characterization.
Figure 2: Political and Epistemic Legitimacy in Corporate Governance
epistemic epistemic
legitimacy legitimacy
siren 9 weak
political legitimacy Congres
-strong
political legitimacy Delaware SEC
weak
Congress, for its part, possesses political legitimacy far exceeding the
SEC or Delaware. Congress, we must recall, possesses ample constitutional
authority to legislate in this area (the internal affairs doctrine
notwithstanding),223 and by comparison many have called into question
Delaware's political legitimacy to address matters impacting a broad range of
regulatory fields and numerous constituencies well beyond Delaware's
borders. As Renee Jones explains, "concerns about the lack of political
representation in the state lawmaking process fade at the federal level, where
all adult citizens enjoy political representation," and where Congress
220Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects
Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtmi (last modified Oct. 10, 2010) [hereinafter SEC,
Investor's Advocate]; see also CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 132, at 1.
221See SEC, Investor's Advocate, supra note 220.
222Cf Winship, supra note 160, at 212 (suggesting that the "flip side of [agency]
specialization is that agencies are not expected to be expert beyond the limits of the statute or subject
area they administer").
See supra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.
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routinely must "balance the interests of competing constituencies in ways
that legislators in Delaware and other states can avoid."2 24  Mark Roe
observes that, unlike Delaware's focus on the directors and shareholders who
control the substantial flow of franchise taxes to the state's coffers, Congress'
intervention in corporate governance "brings with it another strain of public
policy: American populist sentiment and national public opinion," which
will tend to "dilute the impact of managers and investors" in the federal
lawmaking process. 2 5  Accordingly, Delaware's critics have vigorously
challenged the legitimacy of one (small) state effectively determining the
laws governing most of corporate America.226
Yet, it is undoubtedly Delaware that possesses the greatest epistemic
legitimacy--by which I mean an authoritative reputation for expert, policy-
relevant knowledge.2 7 As Kahan and Kamar observe, a "principal attraction
of incorporating in Delaware is the high quality of its chancery court,"
consisting of expert, well-supported judges hearing numerous corporate
221 nthsdisputes without juries. On this, they rightly add, "[t]here is a wide
consensus . . . among academics, practitioners, and members of the
judiciary."29 Delaware's Division of Corporations touts the "complete
package of incorporations services" that Delaware provides, including an
"advanced and flexible" statute, a "business court that has written most of
the modern U.S. corporation case law," a state government that is "business-
friendly and accessible," and an efficient corporations division23 -a self-
serving depiction, to be sure, but a largely accurate one.
224Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case For Regulatory Redundancy,
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1298-99 (2009); see also Kahan & Kamar, supra note 127, at 743-44;
Strine, supra note 122, at 1080-81.
225Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, supra note 122, at 16-17; see
also Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CoRp. L. 99, 1 01-03,
135-36 (2004).
226See generally Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in
Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2004); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets and
Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74 UMKC L. REV. 41 (2005); see also Jones,
supra note 224, at 1298-1300. David Skeel has suggested that legitimacy concerns may explain the
high degree of unanimity in the Delaware Supreme Court's opinions. David A. Skeel, The
Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127, 171 (1997). Likewise Lucian
Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani have suggested that Delaware's high degree of "reliance on judge-
made law reduces the extent to which applying Delaware corporate law for most of the country's
large firms is viewed as arbitrary and illegitimate." Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 37, at 604.
227See Bruner, supra note 216, at 130.
228Kahan & Kamar, supra note 127, at 708.
229Id. at 708 n.95; see also McDonnell, supra note 225, at 106, 118. But see Klausner,
supra note 127, at 84347 (arguing that "network externalities" augment Delaware's dominance in
attracting new incorporations).
230See Division of Corporations, supra note 37.
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B. The Least-Bad Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate
This state of affairs-in which no governmental actor possesses both
strong political legitimacy and strong epistemic legitimacy-is depicted in
Figure 2 (above). Clearly a decisionmaker combining the strongest
democratic mandate among those affected by its decisions, coupled with the
greatest degree of expert knowledge, would represent the ideal. In the
regulation of corporate governance, however, no single entity achieves this.
So of the three relevant actors, which provides the most desirable overall
balance of political and epistemic legitimacy in addressing fundamental
issues like the scope of the shareholders' bylaw authority?
There is a strong argument to be made that, of the three, reliance on
Delaware-at least in the first instance-represents the least-bad approach.
In addition to its considerable epistemic legitimacy, Delaware derives at least
some measure of political legitimacy from long-standing federal
acquiescence in its dominant role as a corporate lawmaker. As McDonnell
observes, "the threat of federal intervention limits what Delaware can do,"
broadening the base of constituencies represented in the lawmaking process,
and in particular, inhibiting "overly pro-managerial developments in state
law while still leaving room for much lawmaking and experimentation at the
state level."23' Mark Roe likewise observes that "Delaware does seem to
formulate policy with an eye on Washington," and that regardless of the
volume of corporate law emerging from Delaware, Congress remains the
"big gorilla of American economic lawmaking," capable of displacing
Delaware's General Assembly and courts at any time "if they upset those
who can influence Washington.""'
In some cases, to be sure, Delaware endeavors to blunt anticipated
federal moves in the area, as when it amended the DGCL to include a proxy
access provision permitting ownership thresholds to be established in the
bylaws at a higher level than those expected in the anticipated federal rule.233
In times of crisis, however, Delaware quite rationally avoids confrontation
with the federal government, a posture vividly illustrated in the aftermath of
J.P. Morgan's federal government-orchestrated acquisition of Bear Steams,
when the Delaware Court of Chancery uncharacteristically agreed to stay a
Delaware action challenging the use of extraordinary deal protections that
almost certainly violated established Delaware precedent, permitting the
23
'McDonnell, supra note 225, at 101; see also id. at 136-38.
232 Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, supra note 122, at 6, 9.
233See supra note 23. As noted above, the effort was unsuccessful. See supra notes 146-152
and accompanying text.
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litigation to proceed in New York instead.234 As Ed Rock and Marcel Kahan
reasonably query, "how could Delaware even contemplate enjoining a
transaction that was supported, indeed, arguably driven and financed by the
Federal Reserve with the full support of the Treasury-a transaction that
may have been necessary to prevent a collapse of the international financial
system?"' By avoiding such confrontation-and particularly by bowing to
the superior position of the federal government in matters involving political
and social dimensions exceeding those normally associated with corporate
governance-Delaware prudently manages its political capital and avoids
"induc[ing] doubts about [its] ability to handle its role as maker of national
corporate law."236 Conversely, the fact that congressional intervention in
corporate governance--though not infrequent-has consistently remained
crisis-driven and piecemeal suggests that the likelihood of a complete
federalization of corporate governance remains low indeed.3
The practical upshot of the analysis set forth above (depicted in
Figures 1 and 2) is that the SEC's impact on state-level analysis of
shareholder bylaws represents a distortion to be minimized. To be clear, this
need not involve congressional action, removal of state law-based Rule 14a-
8 exclusions, or elimination of Delaware's certification process, which in any
event would involve substantial legal change (with attendant sound and fury)
at both federal and state levels.238 We can assume, for example, that there
will be circumstances in which it really is clear that the subject of a given
shareholder proposal falls squarely within the board's authority under state
law, in which case failing to exclude the proposal would be tantamount to an
assertion of federal competence to take power away from the board and give
it to the shareholders-a truly "radical . .. federal intervention" regarding
which courts would naturally expect a crystal clear expression of
234See In re The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 3643-VCP,
2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46 (Del. Ch. 2008); Rock & Kahan, supra note 128, at 714-16.
23
'Rock & Kahan, supra note 128, at 744.
2361d. at 744-45; see also Bruner, supra note 104, at 333-35; Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The
Policy Foundations ofDelaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1770-71 (2006).
237See, e.g., Veasey, supra note 122, at 42-55; see also Bruner, supra note 104, at 333-34;
Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, supra note 122, at 7-8,33; Jones, supra
note 224, at 1303-06; Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 122, at 596-98; Romano, supra note
127, at 210; Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859, 872-76, 906-07 (2003).
238For a brief overview of the SEC's rulemaking process-sometimes involving the issuance
of a detailed "concept release" to solicit feedback prior to the issuance of a proposed rule, subject to
additional public comment-see SEC, Investor's Advocate, supra note 220, at "How the SEC
Rulemaking Process Works." In Delaware, abandonment of the SEC certification process would
require amending the state constitution to remove it. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8).
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congressional intent."'
A far more pragmatic approach to the problem, permitting the SEC to
withdraw itself entirely from a thorny set of issues that it is not prepared to
address, would involve the SEC itself simply returning to the approach it has
purported to take in the past---but, this time around, actually applying it
consistently and strictly. If the SEC were to categorically apply the
company's burden of persuasion already established in Exchange Act Rule
14a-8, and consequently refuse to provide no-action assurance permitting
exclusion where that burden cannot be met due to competing opinions on the
proposal's legality under Delaware law, then the substantial problems
described in this Article-including resort to the problematic Delaware
Supreme Court certification process-would literally go away.
It should be emphasized that evaluating bylaw proposals implicating
contested matters of Delaware law places the SEC in an untenable position
and likely hurts shareholders, the constituency it is charged to protect.
Recall that the Delaware Supreme Court has articulated two standards for
assessing bylaws - one for proposed bylaws (arriving via the SEC), and
another for enacted bylaws (arriving via traditional Delaware litigation).240
The SEC's task under Rule 14a-8(i)(2) is to determine whether a proposed
bylaw, if enacted, would cause the company to violate state law - but of
course the underlying message in CA, Inc. is that there is effectively no way
to evaluate bylaws at the proposal stage, due to the ripeness doctrine and the
concerns motivating it (to which the presumption of validity for enacted
bylaws is closely related). 24 1 To be sure, the SEC could itself simply apply
the "one such hypothetical" standard applied in CA, Inc. Given the potential
for misuse of any bylaw, however, such a stringent standard would
effectively shut down shareholder bylaws in public companies - an outcome
tantamount to usurping an important state law issue, contradicting DGCL
section 109, and abandoning its own investor protection mission in a single
go. Alternatively, the SEC could try to guess how the bylaw would actually
be used, and then focus its evaluation on that anticipated use (assuming its
own non-involvement in vetting the bylaw, one imagines). This, however,
would fly in the face of sound policies motivating the ripeness doctrine,
likely resulting in just the sort of indeterminate floundering that led the SEC
to punt to the Delaware Supreme Court in the first place. Far better to
categorically apply the company's burden of persuasion already established
in Rule 14a-8, permitting contested matters of Delaware law to be addressed
239LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 129, at 554.
240See supra notes 212-215 and accompanying text.
241See supra notes 79-81, 198-211 and accompanying text.
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through traditional Delaware litigation.
In such a case, the Delaware courts could assess those bylaws actually
enacted, with the benefit of a fully developed factual record illustrating their
application, and apply the same presumption of validity historically
applicable to all challenged bylaws.242 While it has been fairly suggested that
lack of clarity in Delaware regarding the appropriate balance of power
between the board and the shareholders has effectively invited some degree
of "stealth preemption" at the federal level, 2 43 the lack of clarity regarding the
permissible scope of shareholder bylaws is at least partly attributable, as
Vice Chancellor Strine observes, to "the inability of stockholders to actually
get real proposals on the table."2" Allowing through those proposals relating
to matters unsettled under Delaware law would, as McDonnell explains,
permit "much more extensive development of the law in this area, with more
expert state judges making decisions with much more detailed reasoning
than the SEC staff provides in no-action letters" 245-all the while subject to
potential state legislative intervention reflecting the interests of boards and
shareholders, as well as federal legislative intervention reflecting the
interests of a broader range of constituencies.2"
To be sure, concerns regarding the costs of more numerous-and
potentially vexatious-shareholder proposals at the federal level and
litigation at the state level are entirely legitimate. Neither, however, need in
fact occur. Regardless of the SEC's posture on state law-based exclusions,
Rule 14a-8's present structure already suggests numerous alternative levers
to pull in order to regulate the flow of shareholder proposals without
distorting the development of state law. For example, Rule 14a-8 already
requires that numerical threshold qualifications be met, including that the
shareholder have held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1 percent, of the
company's securities entitled to vote for at least one year, and continue to do
so through the meeting; that each shareholder submit no more than one
242Cf CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emp. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008).
243Thompson, supra note 57, at 776.
2SEC, Roundtable Discussions, supra note 55, at 23; see also id. at 34, 79; Strine, supra
note 122, at 1098; Gen. Datacomm Indus., Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 822
(Del. Ch. 1999).
245McDonnell, supra note 20, at 257.
246Compare SEC, Roundtable Discussions, supra note 55, at 34 (Vice Chancellor Strine
observing that "if we make the wrong decisions, you can bet we are going to hear about it from the
institutional investor community and from the management community"), with Roe, Delaware and
Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, supra note 122, at 17 (observing that while boards and
shareholders "are also influential at the federal level, an array of other interests and ideas also come
into play").
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proposal per meeting; and that the proposal be kept to 500 words.247 The rule
also permits exclusion of a proposal that "deals with substantially the same
subject matter as another [recently submitted] proposal," based on the level
of support the proposal previously received.248 A host of similar bright-line
eligibility criteria--perhaps raising the minimum investment level, or
requiring a threshold showing of interest by some specified percentage of
shareholders-might be employed to limit shareholder proposals to a
reasonable, cost-justified volume.249
It should also be borne in mind that applying state law-based
exclusions by reference to opinions of counsel25 o incorporates at least a weak
constraint against inclusion of frivolous proposals e lawyers' professional
responsibilities. Admittedly, legal opinions submitted to SEC staff in
connection with no-action requests are thought to be "low-risk from the
firm's standpoint," one practitioner suggesting that "[t]here probably isn't a
risk of third-party liability in this circumstance; rather than an opinion to a
private party, it's more like written advocacy."." Nevertheless, such an
opinion "still needs to be credible"252 and, as any lawyer with an active
securities practice is acutely aware, the SEC possesses the power to bar a
lawyer from practicing before it if he or she is found to be "lacking in
character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct."253 One hopes, then, that norms of professionalism
among the corporate bar, reputational considerations, and awareness of
potentially dire consequences at the SEC would combine to deter sufficiently
the rendering of frivolous legal opinions simply to permit shareholder clients
to get proposals into company proxies.
At the state level, meanwhile, there is little reason to believe that a
flood of bylaw-related litigation would cripple the Delaware Court of
Chancery. In addition to the range of potential federal filters at the proposal
stage, recall that Delaware courts already apply a very effective filter in the
24717 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1), (c)-(d).
2481d. § 240.14a-8(i)(12).
249See, e.g., SEC, Roundtable Discussions, supra note 55, at 43-45, 196-98, 229, 241;
Strine, supra note 122, at 1100-01.
2
soSee supra notes 155-171 and accompanying text.
251Berkeley, supra note 163, at "Legal Opinions."
2521d.
1l7 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(ii) (2010). The scope of such a bar would render it
catastrophic for the lawyer in question, as the SEC defines "appearing and practicing before the
Commission" to include providing advice in connection with any filing, and indeed any form of
communication with the Commission. Id. § 205.2(a). Given the severity, the SEC has used this
authority "exceedingly sparingly," and most often following "a prior disbarment by state bar
authorities." See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 132, at 184-85.
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form of the ripeness doctrine, requiring that a bylaw be enacted before the
courts will hear challenges to its validity.25 Indeed, among the investor
community there remains great enthusiasm for precatory proposals-that is,
recommendations to the board, rather than mandates-as a means of
fostering dialogue."' Assuming that precatory proposals are permitted by
Delaware law,256 they could in no event give rise to a dispute regarding the
validity of a bylaw proposed by shareholders because, by hypothesis, such a
bylaw could be enacted only with the cooperation of the board.257
V. CONCLUSIONS
The SEC ought to reflect on the crowning irony of its resort to the
much-heralded mechanism for certifying questions to the Delaware Supreme
Court. Shareholders--the SEC's people-are effectively left worse off for
the agency's engagement with the issue of shareholder bylaws than they
would be if exclusion were simply refused, leaving gray-area proposals
entirely to Delaware.'
To be sure, I have criticized elsewhere those recent initiatives aimed at
expanding shareholders' governance rights as a faulty response to the
financial crisis, and believe that the political and social forces motivating
U.S. corporate law's historically ambivalent posture toward shareholders
remain as potent as ever.5 As the analytical approach taken by the
Delaware Supreme Court in CA, Inc. tends to suggest, however, it is far from
obvious that allowing more bylaw proposals into proxies at the federal level
would necessarily translate into substantial expansion of shareholder power
at the state level. As discussed above, Delaware's nascent bylaw
jurisprudence appears to be closely tracking the analytical approach taken in
254See supra notes 200-211 and accompanying text.
2 sSee SEC, Roundtable Discussions, supra note 55, at 231 (Ann Yerger, Executive
Director of the Council of Institutional Investors, explaining that institutions "in many cases . . .
don't want to be overly prescriptive," whereas precatory proposals are viewed as a means of fostering
"dialogue" and "communication"); see also LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 129, at 573
(characterizing the "very opportunity to submit proposals, even of an advisory nature," as
"afford[ing] a safety valve for stockholder expression at a price that to the registrant would seem to
be relatively slight"); Strine, supra note 122, at 1098 ("Gagging institutional investors from
attempting to exercise their state law rights will, in the long run, just generate frustration and fuel
appeals for more federal'solutions."').
256See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
257See SEC, Roundtable Discussions, supra note 55, at 79 (Vice Chancellor Strine
observing that, "frankly, a lot of times the boards go along with it voluntarily once there is a
stockholder vote").
258See supra part M.
259See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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its hostile takeover jurisprudence, reflecting the fact that the underlying
matters at issue-the fundamental debates on corporate power and purpose
that define the field-are virtually identical in these seemingly dissimilar
settings. In each case, the court has used the board's fiduciary duties as a
flexible means of massaging the policy choices at issue in thrashing out
contested claims about the nature and purpose of Delaware
corporations-essentially bracketing deeply contested social and political
issues that continue to defy tidy resolution, while in the meantime
endeavoring to maintain a workable and predictable corporate governance
structure to the degree possible.260 For lack of a better alternative-and in
the absence of any governmental actor with greater overall legitimacy in
such matters261-leaving them to Delaware remains the least-bad approach.
APPENDIX
General Bylaw Authority: Statutes By Type
Table 1: By law Statutes Resembling Delaware's § 1O9(a)"
State Statute
Delaware DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8 § 109 (2010)
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6009 (2009)
Maryland MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-109 (2010)
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 156D § 10.20 (2010)
Missouri SECTION 351.290, RSMo 2006. (2010)
New York N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 601 (2010)
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1701.11 (2010)
Pennsylvania 15 PA.C.S. § 1504 (2010)
26"See supra part II.
6'See supra part IV.
262Salient Delaware features include (1) inalienable shareholder bylaw authority; (2) board
bylaw authority only if the charter provides; and (3) no guidance regarding their relationship. The
Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania statutes permit a shareholder bylaw to confer board bylaw
authority. The Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania statutes permit shareholders to amend or
repeal board bylaws. The Maryland and Missouri statutes appear to permit divestment of shareholder
bylaw authority (through the charter or bylaws in Maryland and through the charter in Missouri).
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Table 2: Bylaw Statutes Resembling MBCA § 10.20263
State Statute
Alabama ALA. CODE § 10-2B-10.20 (2010)
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-1020 (2010)
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1020 (2010)
California CAL. CORP. CODE § 211 (2009)
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-110-201 (2009)
Connecticut CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 33-806 (2010)
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1020 (2010)
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1020 (2010)
Hawaii HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-301 (2010)
Idaho IDAHO CODE § 30-1-1020 (2010)
Illinois 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2.25 (2010)
Iowa IOWA CODE § 490.1020 (2010)
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.10-200 (2010)
Maine ME. REv. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13-C, § 1020 (2009)
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1231 (2010)
Mississippi MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-10.20 (2010)
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-234 (2010)
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-20, 125 (2010)
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293A-10.20 (2010)
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-9 (2010)
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-10-20 (2010)
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. § 60.461 (2009)
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-203 (2010)
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-10-200 (2009)
South Dakota S.D.C.L. § 47-1A-1020 (2009)
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-20-201 (2010)
Texas TEx. Bus. ORG. CODE ANN. § 21.057 (2010)
- Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-1OA-1020 (2010)
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. TIT 11A § 10.20 (2010)
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-714 (2010)
Washington WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 23B.10.200 (2010)
West Virginia W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31D-10-1020 (2010)
Wisconsin Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.1020 (2010)
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-1020 (2010)
263Salient MBCA features include (1) inalienable shareholder bylaw authority; (2) board
bylaw authority unless the charter provides otherwise; and (3) shareholder capacity to insulate
bylaws from board interference. The North Carolina statute requires affirmative authorization (in the
charter or a shareholder bylaw) for the board to amend or repeal a shareholder bylaw.
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Table 3: Bylaw Statutes Resembling 1969 MBCA § 27"
State Statute
District of Columbia D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-101.24 (2010)
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:28 (2010)
Minnesota MINN. STAT. § 302A. 181 (2009)
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-27 (2009)
North Dakota (BCA) N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-31 (2010)
Table 4: Other Bylaw Statutes
State Statute
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.228 (2010)
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-39-1 (2010)
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.120 (2009)
North Dakota (PTCA) N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-05 (2010)
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18 § 1013 (2009)
264Salient 1969 MBCA features include (1) board bylaw authority "unless reserved to the
shareholders" in the charter; and (2) inalienable shareholder authority to amend or repeal board
bylaws. The District of Columbia and New Mexico statutes omit explicit shareholder authority to
amend or repeal board bylaws.
265The remaining statutes vary considerably. The Indiana and Oklahoma statutes limit
bylaw authority to the board unless the charter provides otherwise. The Alaska statute gives bylaw
authority to both the board and the shareholders, while permitting either to be limited or eliminated
in the charter. The Nevada statute gives bylaw authority to both the board and the shareholders, and
permits shareholders to insulate bylaws from board interference, yet permits the shareholders' bylaw
authority (but not the boards') to be eliminated in the charter. The North Dakota Publicly Traded
Corporations Act (which, for companies opting in, supplements the Business Corporation Act and
trumps it where they conflict under § 10-35-04) appears to provide that shareholders possess
inalienable bylaw authority, the board possesses bylaw authority unless the charter provides
otherwise, and shareholders possess inalienable authority to amend or repeal board bylaws.
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